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INTRODUCTION
A central tenet of American foreign relations law is that customary
Z international law ("CIL") has the domestic legal status of federal
common law. In a recent article, we labeled this view the "modern
position."1 We argued that the modem position rose to orthodoxy
only recently and that it is inconsistent with basic understandings re-
garding American representative democracy, federal common law,
separation of powers, and federalism. We concluded that courts
should not apply CIL as federal law unless authorized to do so by the
federal political branches.
* Associate Professor, University of Colorado School of Law.
** Associate Professor, University of Chicago Law School. We would like to
thank Kathryn Bradley, David Fidler, Hiroshi Motomura, Bob Nagel, Steve Smith,
Cass Sunstein, Art Travers, Andrew Vollmer, Arthur Weisburd, and John Yoo for
their helpful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank Sarah Good for
her excellent research assistance. Professor Goldsmith thanks the Arnold and Frieda
Shure Research Fund for support.
1. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Customar, International Law as
Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110 Harv. L Rev. 815, 816
(1997).
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The principal significance of the modern position concerns the legit-
imacy of international human rights litigation in U.S. courts.2 In re-
cent years, U.S. courts have been faced with a growing number of
cases involving alleged human rights abuses in foreign countries.3 The
authority of U.S. courts to hear and provide relief in such cases has
largely been premised on the validity of the modern position. Never-
theless, there may be theories other than the modern position that
would support such litigation.4 Our earlier work only briefly touched
on these alternate theories; we consider them more fully here. We
also respond to criticisms of our earlier work made in this issue by
fellow panelists Gerald Neuman, Beth Stephens, and Ryan Goodman
and Derek Jinks.5
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly summarizes our
thesis and explains why the legitimacy of human rights litigation is
what is really at stake in debates over the modern position. Part II
responds to criticisms of certain of our historical and constitutional
claims. Part III considers whether the judicial treatment of interna-
tional human rights law as federal law can plausibly be justified, in-
dependent of the modem position, by the Alien Tort Statute and the
Torture Victim Protection Act. We conclude that it cannot. The fed-
eral political branches can authorize international human rights litiga-
tion if they wish. But with narrow exceptions, they have not done so
thus far. Until they do, international human rights litigation rests on a
tenuous legal foundation.
I. A CRITIQUE OF THE MODERN POSITION
A. Summary
The two principal sources of public international law are treaties
and CIL. Treaties are express agreements among nations.6 CIL is the
law of the international community that "results from a general and
consistent practice of states followed by them from a sense of legal
obligation."7 Both forms of international law impose binding obliga-
tions on nations on the international plane. International law, how-
2. See id. at 818-19, 821, 832-34, 869-70.
3. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996); In re Estate of Marcos
Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. 1992); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F.
Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995).
4. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 872-73.
5. See Gerald L. Neuman, Sense and Nonsense About Customary International
Law: A Response to Professors Bradley and Goldsmith, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 371
(1997); Beth Stephens, The Law of Our Land: Customary International Law as Fed-
eral Law After Erie, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 393 (1997) [hereinafter Stephens, The Law
of Our Land]; Ryan Goodman & Derek P. Jinks, Filartiga's Firm Footing: Interna-
tional Human Rights and Federal Common Law, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 463 (1997).
6. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States,
pt. I, introductory note, at 18 (1987) [hereinafter Restatement (Third)].
7. Restatement (Third), supra note 6, § 102(2), at 24.
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ever, does not itself specify how nations must treat these obligations
as a matter of domestic law.8 Instead, the domestic legal status of
international law is determined by each nation's domestic law.
The U.S. Constitution states in Article VI that treaties are part of
the "supreme Law of the Land,"9 and in Article III that cases arising
under treaties fall within the judicial power of the federal courts.', By
contrast, neither of these articles mentions CIL, which at the time of
the founding was referred to as part of the "law of nations."" More-
over, as Professor Henkin has noted, the language of the Supremacy
Clause "does not easily include [customary] international law."' 2 The
Constitution's only express reference to CIL is in Article I, which pro-
vides that Congress has the power to "define and punish... [o]ffenses
against the Law of Nations."' 3
Despite this contrast between the Constitution's treatment of trea-
ties and its treatment of CIL, proponents of the modern position ar-
gue that CIL, like treaties, has the status of federal law. It has this
status, the argument goes, by virtue of the common law powers of the
federal courts. Under this view, U.S. courts are to apply CIL as fed-
eral law even in the absence of authorization by the federal political
branches.
14
8. See Louis Henkin et al., International Law: Cases and Materials 153 (3d ed.
1993) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law]. Accordingly, nations "differ as to
whether international law is incorporated into domestic law and ... whether the exec-
utive or the courts will give effect to norms of international law or to treaty provisions
in the absence of their implementation by domestic legislation." Id.
9. See U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2 ("[A]I Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land
10. See U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and
Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority .... ").
11. See Edwin D. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of
the United States, 101 U. Pa. L. Rev. 26, 26-27 (1952); Stewart Jay, The Status of the
Law of Nations in Early American Law, 42 Vand. L Rev. 819, 821-22 (1989) [herein-
after Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations].
12. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the United States Constitution 508 n.16 (2d
ed. 1996) [hereinafter Henkin, Foreign Affairs]. The Supremacy Clause defines
supreme federal law to include the Constitution, treaties, and "the Laws of the United
States which shall be made in Pursuance" of the Constitution. U.S. Const. art. VI, § 2
(emphasis added). CIL is not the Constitution or a treaty, and it is not made pursuant
to U.S. constitutional processes; rather, it is made by the world community "in a pro-
cess to which the United States contributes only in an uncertain way and to an inde-
terminate degree." Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra, at 508 n.16.
13. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
14. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 n.20 (2d Cir. 1980)
("[Ijnternational law has an existence in the federal courts independent of acts of
Congress."); United States v. Buck, 690 F. Supp. 1291, 1297 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) ("Inter-
national law exists in the federal courts independent of acts of Congress ... ."); Louis
Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L Rev. 1555, 1561
(1984) [hereinafter Henkin, International Law as Law] ("International law ... is'self-
executing' and is applied by courts in the United States without any need for it to be
enacted or implemented by Congress.").
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At this level of generality, numerous courts and commentators in
recent years have endorsed the modem position. 5 Courts, however,
have generally endorsed it only in connection with their consideration
of whether CIL is part of the "Laws of the United States" for pur-
poses of Article III "arising under" jurisdiction, and related jurisdic-
tional questions.' 6 Commentators, on the other hand, have more
broadly considered the consequences that the modern position might
have for domestic lawmaking institutions and other forms of domestic
law.' 7 Many commentators plausibly argue that if CIL is federal com-
mon law, it preempts inconsistent state law pursuant to the Supremacy
Clause.' 8 Others plausibly argue that if the modern position is cor-
rect, then judicial interpretations of CIL bind the President under the
"Take Care" Clause of Article II of the Constitution.' 9 Some propo-
15. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 817 nn.3-4, 837 nn.150-51 (collect-
ing numerous sources which support this view of CIL).
16. See, e.g., In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 978 F.2d 493, 501-03
(9th Cir. 1992); Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885-89 (2d Cir. 1980); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193-94 (D. Mass. 1995).
17. Neuman dismisses many of these consequences as "speculative variants on the
modern position offered by particular scholars." Neuman, supra note 5, at 380-81. We
acquiesce in Neuman's efforts to de-legitimate some of the broader consequences of
the modern position, which have been advocated by Professors Glennon, Henkin,
Lobel, Paust, and others. His claim, however, that our description of these broader
consequences involves "errors of commission and omission" because not all propo-
nents of the modern position subscribe to such consequences, see Neuman, supra note
5, at 380, is off the mark. We made clear in our earlier work that there was no canoni-
cal account of the basis for or consequences of the modem position, see Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 816 n.2; we emphasized that the implications of the mod-
ern position "are being developed (and urged on courts) primarily by scholars," id. at
838; and we were careful to flag instances in which scholars disagreed about these
implications, see id. at 844 (noting that "[n]ot all supporters of the modern position
agree with Professor Henkin" that CIL trumps prior inconsistent federal statutes),
and id. at 845 (noting that the view that CIL binds the President is "far from univer-
sally accepted"). Because we lack Neuman's ability to discern which commentators
are "mainstream" and which are not, see Neuman, supra note 5, at 381, our goal was
simply to show that all of the potential consequences of the modern position for do-
mestic lawmaking-whatever their other demerits-depend on the view that CIL is
federal law. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 844, 846. Neuman's confi-
dence in a relatively narrow variant of the modern position, and his dismissal of other
variants, is therefore best addressed to supporters of the modern position, not to us.
18. See, e.g., Restatement (Third), supra note 6, §§ 111(1), 115 cmt. e; Lea
Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority, and the Preemptive Power of International
Law, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 295, 303; Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 14, at
1561.
19. See, e.g., Michael J. Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana: Is Violation of
Customary International Law by the Executive Unconstitutional?, 80 Nw. U. L. Rev.
321, 348-58 (1985) [hereinafter Glennon, Raising The Paquete Habana]; Jules Lobel,
The Limits of Constitutional Power: Conflicts Between Foreign Policy and Interna-
tional Law, 71 Va. L. Rev. 1071, 1116-20 (1985); Jordan J. Paust, The President Is
Bound by Customary International Law, 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 377, 382 (1987) [hereinafter
Paust, The President Is Bound]; cf Frederic L. Kirgis, Jr., Federal Statutes, Executive
Orders and "Self-Executing Custom", 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 371, 374-75 (1987) (concluding
that the Executive has the power to violate CIL only in certain circumstances); Louis
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nents of the modem position even argue that CIL supersedes inconsis-
tent federal legislation.'
Our critique of the modem position began with history. Many
courts and commentators rest their support for the modem position
on nineteenth and early twentieth century judicial decisions that re-
ferred to CIL-or the "law of nations"-as "part of our law" or the
"law of the land."'" The court in the seminal Filartiga decision, for
example, cited these decisions for the proposition that CIL "has al-
ways been part of the federal common law."' These decisions did
not, however, apply CIL as federal law. Rather, they applied it as part
of the "general common law" famously associated with Swift v. Ty-
son.23 Courts applied general common law as a default in the absence
of any particular domestic authorization unless and until state or fed-
eral legislation specified otherwise.24 Unlike modem federal common
law, general common law did not have the status of federal law. 5 As
a result, CIL, as a form of general common law, did not bind the states
Henkin, The President and International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L 930, 935-36 (1986)
[hereinafter Henkin, The President] (same).
20. Professor Henkin has argued that CIL supersedes prior, but not subsequent,
inconsistent federal legislation. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States
Sovereignty: A Century of Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny, 100 Harv. L Rev. 853,
875 (1987) [hereinafter Henkin, Tire Constitution and United States Sovereignty]. Pro-
fessor Paust has gone further, arguing that some CIL rules have the status of U.S.
constitutional law, and therefore supersede even subsequent federal legislation. See
Jordan J. Paust, International Law as Law of the United States 5-6, 95, 338-43 (1996)
[hereinafter Paust, International Law]. Another possible role for international law is
in the interpretation of federal enactments. For a discussion of that role, see Curtis A.
Bradley, The Charming Betsy Canon and Separation of Powers: Rethinking the Inter-
pretive Role of International Law, 86 Geo. L.J. __ (forthcoming) [hereinafter Bradley,
The Charming Betsy Canon].
21. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) ("part of our law");
The Nereide, 13 U.S. 388, 423 (1815) ("law of the land"); see generally Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 849 nn.217, 218 (listing courts and commentators relying
on these precedents).
22. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980).
23. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). For evidence that CIL was treated as general common law in
the nineteenth century, see Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 822-26; see also
Curtis A. Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law in U.S. Courts-Before
and After Erie, 25 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y - (forthcoming) [hereinafter Bradley, The
Status of Customary International Law] (citing additional authority). Ve use the term
"general common law" to refer to the body of non-federal common law applied inde-
pendently by state and federal courts before Erie. This law was sometimes referred to
by courts as the "common law" or the "general law." See Bradley, Tire Status of Cus-
tomary International Law, supra.
24. See Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,
144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1245, 1276-87 (1996); William A. Fletcher, Tire General Common
Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1789: Tie Example of Marine lisurance, 97
Harv. L. Rev. 1513, 1515, 1517-21 (1984); Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common
Law: Part Two, 133 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1231, 1263-79 (1985) [hereinafter Jay, Tire Origins];
Lawrence Lessig, Erie-Effects of Volume 110: An Essay on Contert in Interpretive
Theory, 110 Harv. L. Rev. 1785, 1790-92 (1997).
25. See Fletcher, supra note 24, at 1524-27.
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under the Supremacy Clause,26 did not bind the President under the
Take Care Clause, 7 and did not establish a basis for federal question
jurisdiction. 8
At least until the time of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 9 then, CIL
was viewed as non-federal general common law in the absence of its
incorporation into federal law by the political branches. The Court in
Erie overruled Swift, announced that "[t]here is no federal general
common law," and held that, "[e]xcept in matters governed by the
Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the State."3 As we now know, Erie paved the
way for a new and genuinely federal common law.3' To be consistent
with the requirements of Erie, however, this new federal common law
must be authorized in some fashion by the U.S. Constitution or a fed-
eral statute.32 Such authorization is what gives the new federal com-
mon law its status as supreme federal law.3 3
26. See, e.g., Charles Pergler, Judicial Interpretation of International Law in the
United States 19 (1928) (noting in 1928 that if a state statute "violates an established
principle of international law.., clearly there would be only one course open to the
courts, viz., to enforce the state statute, always assuming its constitutionality and that
it does not contravene any valid federal enactment, or any treaty"); Quincy Wright,
The Control of American Foreign Relations 161 (1922) (noting in 1922 that a "state
constitution or legislative provision in violation of customary international law is valid
unless in conflict with a Federal constitutional provision or an act of Congress").
27. See, e.g., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (stating that courts are
to apply CIL "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act
or judicial decision").
28. With regard to federal question jurisdiction under Article III, see American
Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. 511, 545-46 (1828) (holding that a case involving application
of the "law, admiralty and maritime"-elements of the law of nations-does "not in
fact, arise under the Constitution or Laws of the United States" within the meaning of
Article III). With regard to statutory federal question jurisdiction, see Ker v. Illinois,
119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886) (holding that "laws... of the United States" in Section 25 of
Judiciary Act of 1789 does not include the law of nations); City and County of San
Francisco v. Scott, 111 U.S. 768, 769 (1884) (same); and New York Life Ins. Co. v.
Hendren, 92 U.S. 286, 286-87 (1875) (same).
29. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
30. Id. at 78.
31. See Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie-And of the New Federal Common
Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 383, 405-07 (1964). Stephens is right that there were pre-Erie
precursors to a genuinely federal common law, but she is mistaken in suggesting that
these pre-Erie precedents treated customary international law as federal law. See in-
fra pp. 333-34.
32. See Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law, 99
Harv. L. Rev. 883, 895-96 (1986); Friendly, supra note 31, at 407, 421; Larry Kramer,
The Lawmaking Power of the Federal Courts, 12 Pace L. Rev. 263, 287 (1992); Thomas
W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 17
(1985); Henry P. Monaghan, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal
System, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 889, 892 (1974) (book review); George Rutherglen, Recon-
structing Erie: A Comment on the Perils of Legal Positivism, 10 Const. Commentary
285, 294 (1993). But see Louise Weinberg, Federal Common Law, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev.
805, 813 (1989) ("Courts must act, of course, within their constitutional and statutory
jurisdiction. But no other 'authorization' is required.").
33. See Friendly, supra note 31, at 407.
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Nothing on the face of the Constitution or any federal statute ap-
pears to authorize the modern position's envisioned wholesale appli-
cation of CIL by the federal judiciary. As noted above, Article I
authorizes Congress to define and punish offenses against the law of
nations.' Congress has exercised this and related powers to incorpo-
rate select CIL principles into federal statutes,3 but it has never pur-
ported to incorporate all of CIL into federal law. And Congress's
selective incorporation would be largely superfluous if CIL were al-
ready incorporated wholesale into federal common law.
Some commentators have argued that the authorization for the
modern position comes not from the text but rather from the structure
of the Constitution. They contend that the interpretation and applica-
tion of CIL falls within the exclusive foreign affairs powers of the fed-
eral government and that it is therefore a proper subject for federal
common-lawmaking by the federal courts. In support of this argu-
ment, they rely heavily on the Supreme Court's Sabbatino decision.'
In our prior work, we argued that, contrary to popular lore, Sabbatino
did not hold that CIL was federal law.37 We further argued that the
federal common law of foreign relations to which Sabbatino gave rise
offers no support for the separation of powers claims of the modern
position and, at best, only weak support for the federalism claims.3"
Finally, we argued that, independent of Sabbatino, the modern posi-
tion's federalism claims are in substantial tension with the Supreme
Court's modern federalism jurisprudence, as well as with various ac-
tions by the federal political branches.39
B. What is at Stake
Those uninitiated to the modern position debate might assume that
the debate concerns what has traditionally been thought of as inter-
national law; that is, the law regulating the relations among nations.
This was in fact the focus of pre-World War II CIL, which regulated,
for example, the treatment of diplomats and the use of military force.
This traditional CIL was "authentically customary law-norms that
have in fact resulted from practice."'  The state practice requirement
for the existence of CIL was satisfied by a general, uniform, and usu-
ally longstanding practice.4' The other requirement for the existence
of CIL-the subjective "sense of legal obligation" or opinio juris-
was largely induced by examining the general practice.
34. See supra note 13.
35. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 508 n.16 (citing examples).
36. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
37. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 859-60.
38. Id. at 860-67.
39. Id. at 867-70.
40. Louis Henkin, International Law: Politics and Values 33 (1995) [hereinafter
Henkin, Politics and Values].
41. Id.
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For several reasons, the modern position debate does not primarily
concern this traditional CIL. First, the modem position debate con-
cems the status of CIL in U.S. courts, whereas much of traditional
CIL is only relevant to international diplomatic relations and never
arises in domestic litigation.42 Second, much of the traditional CIL
that was applied by courts as general common law in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries is no longer relevant to domestic litiga-
tion.43 Third, and perhaps most importantly, the federal political
branches have rendered much of the traditional CIL irrelevant for do-
mestic purposes because they have federalized this law by treaty or
statute.44 These reasons help explain why the issue of the domestic
legal status of CIL rarely came up in the decades after Erie.45 They
also explain why the enormous post-1980 literature on the domestic
status of CIL rarely if ever speaks to traditional CIL. It may still be
possible for an occasional issue of uncodified traditional CIL to arise
in domestic litigation. These situations will be rare, however, and they
are not the focus of the modern position debate.46
42. See Restatement (Third), supra note 6, § 111 cmt. c ("Much customary law and
many international agreements ... do not have the quality of law for the courts in that
they do not regulate activities, relations, or interests in the United States."); Phillip R.
Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary International Law, 33 UCLA L. Rev. 665,
670 (1986) [hereinafter Trimble, A Revisionist View] ("In practice, customary interna-
tional law is applied primarily by the political branches, not the judiciary.").
43. For example, the CIL governing prize law, which was frequently applied by
courts in the nineteenth century, had largely disappeared by 1948. See David
Bederman, The Feigned Demise of Prize, 9 Emory Int'l L. Rev. 31, 36-41 (1995) (book
review) (providing various reasons for this phenomenon, such as the fact that the
United States has not been in a declared war since 1945, and the legal predicate to
prize law is that the capture occur during war). Similarly, the law of piracy played a
prominent role in U.S. courts in the nineteenth century but plays a relatively small
role today. See Alfred P. Rubin, The Law of Piracy 298, 337-46 (U.S. Naval War Col-
lege International Law Studies, vol. 63, 1988).
44. Thus, for example, foreign sovereign immunity is now the subject of a compre-
hensive federal statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330,
1602-11 (1994), and diplomatic immunity is the subject of treaties to which the United
States is a party. See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, Apr. 18, 1961,
23 U.S.T. 3227, 500 U.N.T.S. 95.
45. The single post-Erie, pre-Sabbatino decision to squarely address the domestic
legal status of CIL is Bergman v. De Sieyes, 170 F.2d 360 (2d Cir. 1948). In Bergman,
the court sitting in diversity considered whether an ambassador in transit to another
country was entitled under CIL to immunity from service of process. Writing for the
court, Judge Learned Hand explained that "[the New York state courts'] interpreta-
tion of international law is controlling upon us, and we are to follow them so far as
they have declared themselves." Id. at 361. After analyzing three New York decisions
and a variety of international sources, Hand concluded that "the courts of New York
would today hold" that an ambassador in transit is immune under CIL from service of
process in New York. Id. at 363. He added the caveat, however, that "[w]hether an
avowed refusal to accept a well-established doctrine of international law, or a plain
misapprehension of it, would present a federal question we need not consider, for
neither is present here." Id. at 361. Today this issue of diplomatic immunity would be
governed by treaty.
46. See infra part II for further discussion of this point.
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The focus of the modem position debate is rather on what we have
called the "new CIL."4 7 This new CIL can best be understood against
the backdrop of the larger transformation of international law gener-
ally in the post-World War II period. Since the War, international law
has developed to regulate to some extent the ways in which nations
treat their citizens.' The principal sources of this change have been a
series of multilateral human rights treaties49 and several non-binding
United Nations General Assembly Resolutions, most notably the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.5 0 Although the United States
47. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 838-42; cf Henkin, Politics and
Values, supra note 40, at 33-39 (distinguishing, among other things, between "estab-
lished customary law" and "contemporary customary law"); Bruno Simma & Philip
Alston, The Sources of Human Rights Law: Custom, Jus Cogens, and General Princi-
ples, 12 Austl. Y.B. Int'l L. 82, 89-90 (1992) (distinguishing between "the old-style of
practice-based custom, la coutume sage" and "ia coutume sauvage- a product grown in
the hot house of parliamentary diplomacy and all too often sold as customary before
having stood the test of time" (footnote omitted)).
48. See Mark Janis, An Introduction to International Law 247-48 (2d ed. 1993);
David Luban, The Legacies of Nuremberg, 54 Soc. Research 779,780-81 (1987); Louis
B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather
Than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 9-10 (1982). On the pre-World War II antecedents
to international human rights law, see Henkin, Politics and Values, supra note 40, at
169-73.
49. Among the most prominent agreements, in chronological order, are the Con-
vention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2, at 1 (1978), 660 U.N.T.S. 195; the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. D, 95-2, at 1 (1978), 993
U.N.T.S. 3; the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by the
U.N. General Assembly Dec. 19, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2, at 1 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S.
171; the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Vo-
men, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13, 19
I.L.M. 33; the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, opened for signature Feb. 4, 1985, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-
20 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027, as modified, 24 I.L.M. 535; and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Nov. 20, 1989,28 I.L.M.
1448.
50. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A1810 (1948). Other
prominent resolutions include the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from
Being Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman, or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, and the Declaration on the Rights of the Child, both of which were even-
tually succeeded by multilateral conventions. Human rights resolutions that have not
yet been succeeded by treaties include the Declaration on the Rights of Mentally
Retarded Persons; the Declaration on the Rights of Disabled Persons; the Declara-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, the Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals Who Are Not
Nationals of the Country in Which They Live; the Declaration on Social and Legal
Principles Relating to the Protection and Welfare of Children, with Special Reference
to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and Internationally; the Principles for
the Protection of Persons with Mental Illness and for the Improvement of Mental
Health Care; and the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities. See Richard B. Lillich & Hurst Hannum,
International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy, and Practice 322-23 (3d ed.
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has voted in favor of most-but not all-of the resolutions, it has de-
clined to ratify many of the treaties. Moreover, for the ones that it has
ratified, it has generally insisted, through a series of reservations, un-
derstandings, and declarations ("RUDs"), that the treaties not apply
as domestic law and thus not preempt inconsistent state law. 51 As
Professor Spiro explains, "[T]he Senate has consistently refused to ef-
fect any changes in state laws by way of human rights treaties. ',5 2
Through a little-understood and greatly under-analyzed process,
however, these treaties and resolutions are today understood to be the
sources of an independent CIL of human rights. There is much de-
bate about how this new CIL is made and identified.53 One thing,
however, is clear: This new CIL does not reflect the actual practice of
states. If the traditional state practice requirement were still a neces-
sary prerequisite to the development of a CIL norm, there would be
very little customary international human rights law, for "it is still cus-
tomary for a depressingly large number of States to trample upon the
human rights of their nationals."54 The change in the way CIL is cre-
ated, from the "accretion of practices" to a more "purposive creation
of custom" through treaties and United Nations resolutions, marks a
"radical innovation, and indeed reflects a radical conception."55
1995); Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Actions 53 (Richard
Pierre Claude & Burns H. Weston eds., 1989).
51. Thus, to take the example of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, the non-self-executing declaration "clarif[ies] that the Covenant will not cre-
ate a private cause of action in U.S. courts." Committee on Foreign Relations, Inter-
national Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, S. Exec. Rep. No. 102-23, at 19
(1992). The federalism understanding "serves to emphasize domestically that there is
no intent to alter the constitutional balance of authority between the State and Fed-
eral governments or to use the provisions of the Covenant to 'federalize' matters now
within the competence of the States." Id. at 18. Specific reservations and other condi-
tions that preserve differences between United States law and the requirements of the
Covenant ensure that "changes in U.S. law in these areas will occur through the nor-
mal legislative process." Id. at 4. The RUDs for the Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights are typical of the RUDs attached as conditions to ratification of the other
human rights treaties. See Louis Henkin, U.S. Ratification of Human Rights Conven-
tions: The Ghost of Senator Bricker, 89 Am. J. Int'l L. 341 (1995) [hereinafter Henkin,
US. Ratification].
52. Peter J. Spiro, The States and International Human Rights, 66 Fordham L. Rev.
567, 574 (1997).
53. See, e.g., Henkin, Politics and Values, supra note 40, at 37-39; Martti Kosken-
niemi, From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument 342-
421 (1989); David P. Fidler, Challenging the Classical Concept of Custom: Perspectives
on the Future of Customary International Law, 39 German Y.B. Int'l L. 198, 216-31
(1996).
54. Simma & Alston, supra note 47, at 90.
55. Henkin, Politics and Values, supra note 40, at 37. Professor Henkin continues:
"Whereas law was made by treaty but grew by custom, now there is some tendency to
treat custom as a means, alternative to treaty-making, for deliberate legislation. Us-
ing the concept of custom for that purpose brings with it the traditional definition, but
now practice sometimes means activity designed to create the norm rather than to
reflect it." Id. For commentary questioning the legitimacy of this transformation, see,
e.g., Simma & Alston, supra note 47, at 91-100; J.S. Watson, Legal Theory, Efficacy
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Our focus is not on the precise content of this new CIL or its legiti-
macy on the international plane.56 Rather, our focus is on the proper
status of this new CIL, whatever its content and international legiti-
macy, in the U.S. legal system. But there are at least three well-ac-
cepted aspects of the new CIL that are relevant to its domestic status.
First, since the new CIL now regulates many of the same topics as
domestic law, it conflicts more frequently with domestic law than did
the traditional CIL. Second, this new CIL includes at a minimum the
prohibitions listed in the Restatement (Third).1 Finally, as many com-
mentators have noted, the enormous proliferation of the multilateral
human rights treaties and United Nations human rights resolutions on
which CIL is based suggests that CIL is expanding rapidly and may
already be substantially broader than the Restatement (Third)'s list.58
and Validity in the Development of Hunman Rights Norms in International Law, 1979
U. Ill. Legal F. 609.
56. Despite statements by our fellow panelists to the contrary, nothing in our for-
mer or present analysis purports to address the merits of this new CIL on the interna-
tional plane. Compare Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 839 n.156 ("%Ve take no
position here regarding the legitimacy of this transformation [in the source and con-
tent of CIL] .... ), with Neuman, supra note 5, at 385 (asserting that we suggest that
both traditional and new CIL "has lost its traditional legitimacy"), and Stephens, The
Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 453 (referring to "[tihe exaggerated fear of inter-
national law expressed by authors such as Bradley and Goldsmith"), and Goodman &
Jinks, supra note 5, at 477 (asserting that we "lament the fact international law in-
creasingly purports to regulate 'many areas that were formerly of exclusive domestic
concern').
57. See Restatement (Third), supra note 6, § 702 (stating that CIL prohibits geno-
cide; slavery; summary execution or murder; disappearance; cruel, inhuman, or de-
grading treatment; prolonged arbitrary detention; and systematic racial
discrimination). The Restatement (Third) indicated that its list was a conservative one,
and that other actions, such as religious and gender discrimination, might also violate
CIL. See id. cmts. j, 1. It further observed that "[olther rights may already have be-
come customary law and international law may develop to include additional rights."
Id. reporters' note 1. Many commentators and international lawyers have expressed
the belief that the CIL of human rights is in fact broader than the Restatement
(Third)'s list. Thus, for example, the Human Rights Committee that was established
in connection with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights has issued
a list "far more expansive" than the Restatement (Third)'s list. Richard B. Lillich, The
Growing Importance of Customary International Human Rights Law, 25 Ga. J. Int'l &
Comp. L. 1, 20 (1995/96) [hereinafter Lillich, The Growing Importance].
58. See Theodor Meron, Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary
Law 99 (1989) ("Given the rapid continued development of international human
rights, the list [of CIL norms] as now constituted is essentially open-ended.... Many
other rights will be added in the course of time."); Restatement (Third), supra note 6,
§ 702 cmt. a (noting that its "list [of CIL norms] is not necessarily complete, and is not
closed: human rights not listed in this section may have achieved the status of cus-
tomary law, and some rights might achieve that status in the future"); Lillich, The
Growing Importance, supra note 57, at 7 n.43 (reporting that in a speech in 1996,
Restatement (Third) Chief Reporter Louis Henkin indicated that "if he were drafting
Section 702 today he would include as customary international law rights the right to
property and freedom from gender discrimination, plus the right to personal auton-
omy and the right to live in a democratic society"); Beth Stephens, Litigating Custom-
ary International Hnuman Rights Norms, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L 191, 198-99 (1995/
96) [hereinafter Stephens, Litigating] (describing CIL as a "developing concept" and
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All of our fellow panelists characterize the new CIL applied by fed-
eral courts in much narrower terms. Neuman asserts without further
explanation that judges should apply only "genuine," well-accepted
CIL.59 Stephens claims that the CIL applied by U.S. courts has a nar-
row scope and develops slowly. 6° Goodman and Jinks propose that
the CIL applied by federal courts be limited to jus cogens norms.61
These formulations are understandably designed to narrow concerns
about the scope and consequences of the modern position. But the
panelists fail to provide a theoretical framework within which these
differing formulations can be understood and analyzed. They do not
address the radical changes in the post-World War II CIL lawmaking
process, and they do not explain, in light of these changes, why the
CIL applied by federal courts should be limited as they propose.
More basically, they fail to explain the far-from-obvious process by
which courts are supposed to identify "genuine" or-something quite
different-jus cogens norms of CIL. In view of the many uncertainties
about how CIL is identified in the post-World War II period, we can-
not determine who more accurately characterizes the content and
scope of the new CIL-the commentators cited in the preceding para-
graph, or our critics. We do think, however, that the extraordinary
uncertainty on these crucial issues provides an additional reason why
the political branches rather than the courts should decide which as-
pects of CIL apply as domestic federal law.
We are now in a position to understand what is at stake in the mod-
ern position debate. What is at stake is the enforceability of interna-
tional human rights law in the U.S. federal courts. There is a large
and growing body of international human rights treaties. But the
United States has either not ratified these treaties or has ratified them
subject to RUDs that render them unenforceable as domestic law.
The modern position claim that CIL is to be applied as federal com-
mon law thus "compensate[s] for the abstinence of the United States
vis-a-vis ratification of international human rights treaties."62 It per-
predicting as likely developments "environmental protections and the right to polit-
ical access-i.e., to vote-and other attributes of democracy"). Commentators have
argued, for example, that CIL includes, or will soon include, rights such as freedom of
thought, free choice of employment, the right to primary education, the right to form
and join trade unions, and rights relating to sexual orientation. See Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 1, at 841-42 & nn.169-71 (collecting a small sampling of sources).
59. Neuman, supra note 5, at 376, 27.
60. Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 451-52.
61. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 510-11.
62. Simma & Alston, supra note 47, at 87. Professor Lillich explained the point
more fully as follows:
Although Article VI, section 2 of the Constitution makes treaties the
supreme law of the land, the United States always can avoid or lessen the
domestic impact of human rights treaties by failing to ratify them or by rati-
fying them subject to non-self-executing declarations. However, customary
international law, at least where the United States has not persistently ob-
jected to a particular norm during the process of its formation, ipso facto
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mits federal courts to accomplish through the back door of CIL what
the political branches have prohibited through the front door of
treaties.
II. RESPONSE TO CRITICS
In this Part, we respond to our fellow panelists' arguments concern-
ing the historical and democratic bases for the modern position, and
the consequences of our thesis for the states, federal executive offi-
cials, and the traditional CIL.63
A. Historical Claims
As noted above, much of our critique concerned the historical basis
for the modern position. Our fellow panelists take issue with several
of our historical claims. First, they challenge our claim that the pre-
Erie decisions applying CIL do not support the modern position. Sec-
ond, they challenge our claim that Sabbatino did not establish the
modern position. And, third, they challenge our claim that the mod-
ern position rose to orthodoxy in the 1980s with little scrutiny of pre-
cedent or implications. We consider each challenge in turn.
1. The Pre-Erie Status of CIL
There is little doubt that, before Erie, CIL had the status of general
common law, not federal law. The Supreme Court said as much in
several decisions in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centu-
becomes supreme federal law and hence may regulate activities, relations or
interests within the United States .... Thus, the potential impact of custom-
ary international human rights law upon the American legal system is
substantial.
Richard B. Lilich, The Constitution and International Human Rights, 83 Am. J. Int'l
L. 851, 856-57 (1989) [hereinafter Lillich, The Constitution]; see also Anne Bayefsky &
Joan Fitzpatrick, International Hwnan Rights Law in United States Courts: A Com-
parative Perspective, 14 Mich. J. Int'l L. 1, 4 (1992) ("Because the United States has
been reluctant to ratify human rights treaties, particularly those with a potential do-
mestic impact, the nature of customary [international] human rights law is the key
issue relating to the enforceability of human rights norms in United States courts.");
Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 324 n.87 ("It is not fatal to international law based argu-
ments that the nation has not signed the relevant conventions. Human rights norms,
in particular, have in some cases entered the realm of customary international law as
to states that have not signed the relevant international agreements.").
63. It is worth noting at the outset that the panelists do not present a comprehen-
sive defense of the modern position. Thus, for example, (a) none of the panelists
claims that CIL historically had the status of federal law, even though the seminal
decision approving the modern position made such a claim, as have many academic
proponents of the modern position; (b) none of the panelists claims that CIL binds
the President or overrules inconsistent federal legislation, even though many propo-
nents of the modern position have made those claims; and (c) each of the panelists
suggests a view of the structure and content of CIL that is narrower than that typical
of academic proponents of the modern position.
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ries. 6 4 Many supporters of the modern position have also acknowl-
edged the point.65 And it appears that, to one degree or another, each
of our fellow panelists has done so as well. CIL's non-federal status
prior to Erie does not by itself invalidate the modern position. But it
does undermine the widespread reliance on pre-Erie precedents in
support of the modern position.
Although Neuman and Stephens acknowledge that CIL had the sta-
tus of non-federal general common law before Erie, they both seek to
find normative support for the modern position in history. Stephens
admits that CIL was part of general common law before Erie and that
cases arising under CIL did not arise under the Constitution or laws of
the United States.66 She nevertheless criticizes our historical discus-
sion as a "simplified view [that] overlooks the rich and complex role
international law has played in our legal system for over 200 years."67
She then sets forth a long and detailed description of the framing of
the Constitution and the historical status of international law.68 In our
prior work, we addressed each of her points, none of which affects the
central truth that CIL was not viewed as federal law during most of
our nation's history.
Stephens correctly notes, for example, that the framers of the Con-
stitution and early U.S. leaders viewed international law as binding on
the United States.69 But, as we noted in our earlier work, and as Pro-
fessor Henkin has explained, "[a]lthough international law imposes
obligations on nations, it does not purport to specify how the nations
must treat international obligations as a matter of domestic law."7
During at least the first 150 years of our nation, our constitutional
system permitted states to violate CIL unless and until the federal
political branches said otherwise through enacted federal law.71 Ste-
phens is also right that one of the Framers' primary concerns was the
inability of the federal government during the Articles of Confedera-
tion period to punish infractions of international law, and one of their
primary aims was to establish a constitutional structure that would al-
64. See, e.g., Oliver Am. Trading Co. v. Mexico, 264 U.S. 440, 442-43 (1924); Hunt-
ington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 683 (1892); New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S.
286, 286-87 (1875).
65. See, e.g., Restatement (Third), supra note 6, ch. 2, introductory note, at 41;
Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 14, at 1556-58.
66. See Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 411-12.
67. Id. at 397.
68. See id. at 399-433.
69. See id. at 400-04. This is the likely meaning, for example, of John Jay's state-
ment that "[t]he United States had, by taking a place among the nations of the earth,
become amenable to the law of nations." Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419,
474 (1793). It also may be what Edmund Randolph meant when he stated as Attor-
ney General that the law of nations "is essentially a part of the law of the land. Its
obligation commences and runs with the existence of a nation." 1 U.S. Op. Atty. Gen.
26, 27 (1792).
70. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 819 n.19 (quoting Henkin).
71. See id. at 824-26.
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low for uniform federal enforcement of CIL-' But, as we noted, and
as Stephens seems to acknowledge, this uniformity was not guaran-
teed by the automatic incorporation of CIL into federal law. Rather,
uniformity was promoted by empowering the political branches to en-
act the federal law necessary to carry out international obligations and
to create federal courts with exclusive federal jurisdiction. 3
Somewhat inconsistent with her acknowledgment that CIL was
non-federal general common law, a subsequent section of Stephens's
article is entitled "International Law as Federal Law Pre-Erie." This
section does not live up to its title because it does not cite a single
example of CIL being treated as federal law prior to Erie.74 Stephens
first discusses Supreme Court cases in the early nineteenth century
that rejected a federal common law of crimes, even in cases involving
violations of the law of nations.75 These decisions repudiated earlier
intimations that CIL might apply as federal law, and therefore support
our view of CIL's pre-Erie status.76 Stephens then cites judicial opin-
ions and other documents referring to the law of nations as "part of
72. See Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 402-08.
73. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 824-26: see also Stephens, Tie Law
of Our Land, supra note 5, at 409-11.
74. Stephens suggests that the Supreme Court recognized federal question juris-
diction on the basis of a claim arising under CIL in Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246
U.S. 297 (1918). See Stephens, Tire Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 429 & n.190. In
fact, the Court made perfectly clear that jurisdiction in the Supreme Court was proper
because the plaintiff in error had "set up and claimed" a "right" under the Hague
Convention of 1907. Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 299; see also [1918 version of] 28 U.S.C.
§ 1257 (declaring that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction over states extends to final
state court decisions "where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up
or claimed under [the] Constitution or the treaties or statutes of.. . the United
States." (emphasis added)). The fact that the Court went on to reject this treaty claim
on the merits did not affect this basis of jurisdiction. Nothing in the opinion suggests
that federal jurisdiction was premised on CIL This is not surprising, given that sev-
eral decisions just before and after Oetjen had rejected that possibility. See supra note
64.
75. See Stephens, Tire Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 415-16.
76. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 851 & n.231; see also Arthur M.
Weisburd, The Executive Branch and International Law, 41 Vand. L Rev. 1205, 1213
(1988) (observing that, with these decisions, "it became clear that the Republicans
had won the debate-the 'laws of the United States' did not include either all of
'general law' or its 'law of nations' component"). Stephens also cites the Supreme
Court's adoption of the "Charnring Betsy canon" in the early 1800s. See Stephens, The
Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 417. Pursuant to this canon, courts, where fairly
possible, are to construe federal statutes not to violate international law. See Restate-
ment (Third), § 114; Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118
(1804). This canon "is influenced by the fact that the courts are obliged to give effect
to a federal statute even if it is inconsistent with a pre-existing rule of international
law." Restatement (Third), § 114, cmt. a. Thus, the canon is entirely consistent with
CIL's status in the nineteenth century as general common law, which was subject to
being overruled by federal legislation, and in no way supports the claim that CIL had
the status of federal law. For a critique of recent attempts to recharacterize the canon
along the lines suggested by Stephens, see generally Bradley, Tire Charming Betsy
Canon, supra note 20.
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'our own law,' "part of the law of the land," and the like.77 But, as
we have explained-and Stephens does not really dispute-those ref-
erences reflected CIL's status as general common law and do not sug-
gest that CIL was historically considered federal law.78
Stephens finally argues that a true federal common law binding on
the states began to emerge in the late nineteenth century in areas re-
lated to CIL, such as in interstate and maritime cases.7 9 This is true
but again unsupportive of Stephens's apparent belief that there were
pre-Erie antecedents to the modern position. The Court's late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century federalization of general maritime
law and the general common law governing interstate disputes were
justified under the theory that Article III's grant of admiralty and in-
terstate jurisdiction authorized federal courts to develop a uniform
and supreme federal law within these jurisdictions. 80 These develop-
ments, however, did not extend to most areas of general common law,
and they most definitely did not extend to CIL (which, unlike admi-
ralty and interstate disputes, is not listed as a separate head of federal
judicial power in Article III).8 The Court's analysis in the interstate
dispute cases makes clear its continuing belief that international law
was not federal law.82 The same is true of the maritime cases. In the
very same year that the Court began to treat the general maritime law
as federal law, 3 it held that CIL was not federal law.' The Court
reached this conclusion over Justice Bradley's lone dissent, in which
he argued, like Stephens, that CIL should be treated as federal law
77. See Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 417.
78. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 824, 849-51.
79. See Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 419-25.
80. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1917) (admiralty); Kan-
sas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46, 97 (1907) (interstate dispute).
81. An early draft of Article III, apparently written by James Wilson, would have
extended federal court jurisdiction to cases arising under the "Law of Nations." See 2
The Records of the Federal Convention of 1787, at 157 (Max Farrand ed. 1937). The
reference was deleted, however, without explanation. See Henkin, International Law
as Law, supra note 14, at 1560 n.22; Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations, supra note
11, at 830.
82. The most prominent such case, as Stephens notes, is Kansas v. Colorado, 206
U.S. 46 (1907). This decision developed an "interstate common law" to govern inter-
state disputes. Id. at 97-98. Referring back to its earlier decision in the same dispute,
the Court said the sources for this new law were "[f]ederal law, state law, and interna-
tional law, as the exigencies of the particular case may demand." Id. at 97 (quoting
Kansas v. Colorado, 185 U.S. 146 (1902)). The Court's distinction between interna-
tional and federal law is consistent with the view that CIL was applied during this
period as general common law.
83. As Stephens notes, the decision that first squarely held that admiralty law was
binding on the states, Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917), cites The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. 558 (1875), as support for this proposition. Stephens, supra note
5, at 426-27 n.176 & accompanying text.
84. See New York Life Ins. Co. v. Hendren, 92 U.S. 286 (1875). The Court held
that it lacked jurisdiction to review "general laws of war, as recognized by the law of
nations applicable to this case," because they do not involve "the Constitution, laws,
treaties, or executive proclamations of the United States." Id. at 286-87.
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because of the need for uniformity in foreign relations.' - The Court
continued to hold this view right up until its decision in Erie.'
Neuman takes a different tack from Stephens. Rather than trying
to glean nineteenth century precursors to the modern position, he ig-
nores the difficulties that inhere in relying on the pre-Erie decisions as
support for the modem position. Thus, while he acknowledges CIL's
pre-Erie status as general common law, he nonetheless insists that the
modem position is in the "well-established tradition of incorporation"
-with a "pedigree stretching back to the beginning of the Republic."'
Similarly, he refers to the "200-year-old practice of judicially incorpo-
rating customary international law."'
These assertions fail to take account of the fundamental differences
between pre-Erie general common law and post-Erie federal common
law. Like the Filartiga court's similar move, Neuman wants CIL to
apply automatically as federal law in our post-Erie world on the basis
of precedents that applied CIL automatically as non-federal law under
a framework rejected in Erie. The questionable nature of such a move
is compounded by the fact that the primary relevance of the modem
position concerns the new CIL of human rights, which, unlike the CIL
applied by the pre-Erie precedents, regulates the way in which a na-
tion treats its citizens.8 9
The failure to take account of these fundamental contextual differ-
ences between the modem position and the historical application of
CIL is precisely what has led courts and scholars to rely on pre-Erie
decisions that did not implicate federal question jurisdiction as a basis
for federal question jurisdiction; on pre-Erie decisions applying tradi-
tional customary inter-national law that did not purport to trump state
law as support for the proposition that the new CIL of human rights
trumps state law; and on pre-Erie CIL decisions that did not bind the
Executive under the Take Care Clause as support for the view that the
Executive is so bound under the Take Care Clause. The modem posi-
tion's reliance on the pre-Erie precedents is not, as Neuman insists,
85. Justice Bradley argued that "unwritten international law" was part of the
"laws of the United States" because the law of nations was an exclusive federal con-
cern. Id. at 288. He added: "It is highly expedient that obligations and immunities
[under the law of nations], arising from public law and the public relations of the
government, should be subject to uniform rules, and to the final adjudication of the
judicial department of the general government." Id. Stephens calls the result in Hen-
dren "strange" and Neuman calls Bradley's dissent "prescient." See Stephens, The
Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 428; Neuman, supra note 5, at 374 n.14. Whether
or not these judgments are warranted, the fact remains that eight members of the
Supreme Court in that case rejected the modern position.
86. See cases cited supra note 64.
87. Neuman, supra note 5, at 376, 388 (emphasis added).
88. Id. at 392.
89. Cf Trimble, A Revisionist View, supra note 42, at 723 ("IThere is substantial
doubt that modern customary international law is entitled to claim any legitimacy
from the tradition of the law of nations.").
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merely "old wine in new bottles." 90 It is a new and much more potent
wine in bottles made to look old.
2. Sabbatino
Our fellow panelists do not dispute that all post-Erie federal com-
mon law, including a federal common law of CIL, must be authorized
by the U.S. Constitution or a federal statute. They instead argue that
the authorization can be found in the structure of the Constitution,
and they rely heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino9t
for this proposition.
In assessing this argument, it is important to distinguish among
three possible claims concerning Sabbatino. The first claim is that
Sabbatino itself held that CIL is federal common law. All of our fel-
low panelists can be read as making this claim. 92 This claim, however,
is contradicted by Sabbatino itself. It is true that Sabbatino favorably
referred to a three-page essay by Philip Jessup, in which he had ar-
gued soon after Erie that CIL should be uniformly enforced by the
federal courts.93 But one can view this reference as evidence that Sab-
batino embraced the modern position only if one ignores what the
Court in Sabbatino actually held and did. The Court held only that
the act of state doctrine has the status of federal common law. 94 And it
made clear that the act of state doctrine is not part of CIL.95 Instead,
the Court explained that the act of state doctrine "arises out of the
basic relationships between branches of government in a system of
separation of powers." 96 Moreover, the Court relied on the act of
state doctrine in Sabbatino as a reason for not applying CIL as domes-
tic law-the opposite of what the modern position requires.97 This is
90. Neuman, supra note 5, at 380.
91. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
92. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 375-76, 29; Stephens, The Law of Our Land,
supra note 5, at 484-89; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 445-46, 528.
93. See Philip C. Jessup, The Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins Applied to
International Law, 33 Am. J. Int'l L. 740 (1939).
94. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 (1964) ("We con-
clude that the scope of the act of state doctrine must be determined according to
federal law.").
95. There are at least four statements in the majority opinion to this effect. See id.
at 421 ("We do not believe that [the act of state] doctrine is compelled ... by some
principle of international law."); id. ("That international law does not require applica-
tion of the doctrine is evidenced by the practice of nations."); id. at 422
("[I]nternational law does not prescribe use of the doctrine."); id. at 427 (the act of
state doctrine is "compelled by neither international law nor the Constitution"). The
dissent also agreed with this point. See id. at 444 (White, J., dissenting) (noting that
the act of state doctrine is "not a principle of international law").
96. Id. at 423; see also id. at 427-28 (stating that the act of state doctrine is
designed "to reflect the proper distribution of functions between the judicial and
political branches of the Government on matters bearing upon foreign affairs").
97. Id. at 439; see also id. at 431 (stating that the import of the Court's prior deci-
sions was that "the act of state doctrine is applicable even if international law has
been violated"). Goodman and Jinks assert that the Court held that the act of state
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why the decision was viewed at the time of its announcement as a
major setback for the application of CIL in U.S. courts.9s
Despite the Court's clear statements coficerning the separation of
powers rather than international law basis for the act of state doctrine,
Goodman and Jinks attempt to link it with international law in order
to bring the modem position within the Court's holding. 9 The
Supreme Court in its most recent act of state decision, however, said
unequivocally that the act of state doctrine is considered today "a con-
sequence of domestic separation of powers.""lco And, this is how the
lower courts, including courts supportive of the modern position, have
interpreted Sabbatino.11 It is also how most commentators have read
the decision.' Finally, if it were in fact true that the Supreme Court
held in Sabbatino that CIL is federal common law, one would have
expected the Restatement (Second) of Foreign Relations Law, pub-
lished one year after Sabbatino, to have noticed such a holding. In
fact, the Restatement (Second) said that, notwithstanding Sabbatino,
doctrine precludes only the application of international law that has a "disputed, in-
choate, or undefined status." Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 484. They point to
statements by the Court suggesting that the act of state doctrine might not preclude
the consideration of all international law issues. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428, 430
n.34; Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 481-97. It is far from clear, however, that the
Court was endorsing independent judicial application of CIL, let alone application as
supreme federal law. The Court referred to "treat[ies] or other unambiguous agree-
ment/sJ," Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 430 (emphasis added), which likely meant only trea-
ties and executive agreements, not CIL. And, indeed, the only international law
exception to the act of state doctrine generally recognized by the lower courts since
Sabbatino is for treaties, not CIL. See Gary B. Born, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 738-44 (3d ed. 1996); see also id. at 743 (stating that -Sabbatino
appears to have rejected any such possibility" of a CIL exception to the act of state
doctrine); Callejo v. Bancomer, 764 F.2d 1101, 1117 n.18 (5th Cir. 1985) (-\Ve are
unaware of any cases since Sabbatio that have construed customary international law
to invalidate a foreign act of state.").
98. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 830 & n.96 (collecting sources).
99. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 488.
100. W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectonics Corp., 493 U.S. 400, 404
(1990).
101. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232,249 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that the act
of state doctrine "reflect[s] the judiciary's concerns regarding separation of powers");
Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 358 (2d Cir. 1986) (stating that
"Sabbatino treats the act of state doctrine as resting fundamentally on separation of
powers concerns").
102. See, e.g., Clark, supra note 24, at 1303 & n.273 (stating that -the requirement
that federal courts adhere to the act of state doctrine stems from the constitutional
separation of powers"); Harold Hongju Koh, Transnational Public Law Litigation, 100
Yale LJ. 2347,2363 (1991) (stating that the Court in Sabbatino "shift[ed] ground from
a comity/conflict-of-laws rationale [for the act of state doctrine] to a separation-of-
powers/political-question grounding"); see also Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Lib-
eral States: Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L Rev.
1907, 1911 (1992) [hereinafter Burley, Law Among Liberal States] ("According to
conventional wisdom, Sabbatino transformed the act of state doctrine from a conflicts
doctrine to a doctrine of delimitation of competence based on separation of powers
principles.").
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the status of CIL in U.S. courts was "not settled."1 3 This is presuma-
bly why the Restatement (Second) did not attempt to describe the do-
mestic legal status of CIL in its black-letter provisions. Indeed,
Professor Covey Oliver, one of the reporters for the Restatement (Sec-
ond), has informed us that he and the other reporters "simply did not
find authority to support the position that the... Restatement (Third)
[later] took. 10 4
A second claim one might make concerning Sabbatino is that,
although the decision did not itself adopt the modern position, the
logic of its federalization of the act of state doctrine applies equally to
the status of CIL. At least with respect to the separation of powers
claims of the modern position-that CIL as interpreted by federal
courts binds the Executive and perhaps overrules inconsistent federal
legislation-this claim too is rebutted by Sabbatino itself. Whatever
else it may have said or implied, Sabbatino made clear that the federal
political branches rather than the courts have primary responsibility to
make federal foreign relations law. 105 It was in recognition of this fact
that the Court in Sabbatino crafted the act of state doctrine to prohibit
the domestic application of CIL. It thus makes no sense to read Sab-
batino as authorizing courts, in the name of deference to the political
branches in the area of foreign relations, to bind the political branches
to judicial interpretations of CIL.'0 6 This is perhaps why none of our
fellow panelists seeks to defend that element of the modern position.
They do not explain, however, how CIL can be federal law without
binding the Executive under the Take Care Clause. 07
This leaves the claim that Sabbatino permits federal courts to make
federal foreign relations law that trumps inconsistent state law. Be-
cause of Sabbatino's novel application of what soon came to be known
as the federal common law of foreign relations, 0 8 this is a more plau-
103. Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 3,
reporters' note 2 (1965) [hereinafter Restatement (Second)]. In a statement that fur-
ther assumes that Sabbatino itself did not hold that CIL is federal law, the Restatement
(Second) added that "the holding of the Sabbatino case that Erie v. Tompkins does
not apply to the act of state doctrine would appear to apply a fortiori to questions of
international law." Id. (emphasis added).
104. Letter from Covey T. Oliver to Curtis A. Bradley 1 (1997) (copy on file with
the Fordham Law Review).
105. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino. 376 U.S. 398, 431-33 (1964).
106. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 860-61.
107. All of our fellow panelists wish to assign the status of federal law to CIL but
none of them is willing to defend any implications of this status other than those for
federal court jurisdiction and preemption of state of law. This is an insufficient re-
sponse. If CIL is part of the "Laws of the United States" within the meaning of
Articles III and VI, then why, for example, is it not also part of the "Laws" that the
President must faithfully execute? CIL's status as federal law cannot be defended
simply by pointing to some implications of this status that might be desirable and
ignoring other possible implications that might not be desirable.
108. See John Norton Moore, Federalism and Foreign Relations, 1965 Duke L.J.
248, 261-91; Friendly, supra note 31, at 408 n.119.
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sible position. It is far from certain, however. The majority opinion in
Sabbatino is notoriously inscrutable,1 9 and there is much debate re-
garding the justifications for and scope of the federal lawmaking
power that it conferred on federal courts. Some commentators sug-
gest that it broadly authorizes federal courts to make federal common
law, subject to congressional override, whenever courts decide that
federal foreign relations interests so require." 0 Others would apply
the doctrine more narrowly based on a balance of functional consider-
ations."' Yet others who are sensitive to Sabbatino's emphasis on the
relative incompetence of courts to make foreign relations judgments
view the doctrine as one that "protect[s] courts from entanglements
in, and interbranch conflicts about, matters for which they are not in-
stitutionally suited.""' 2 Finally, some argue that the federal common
law of foreign relations lacks normative justification and has been ef-
fectively repudiated by the Supreme Court in the years sinceSabbatino ."'
Our earlier work explained in detail why we think that most of
these readings will not support the modern position's federalism
claims." 4 One major problem is that, regardless of the scope of the
federal common law of foreign relations, it is far from clear that it
justifies federalization of the new CIL of human rights, which governs
not primarily interstate relations but rather the relations between a
nation and its citizens. We wish to re-emphasize here an additional
point that substantially undermines any support that Sabbatino might
otherwise have provided for these claims.
The federal common law authorized in Sabbatino, like all non-con-
stitutional federal common law, "implements the federal Constitution
and statutes, and is conditioned by them."I" The modern position is
109. For an excellent discussion of the uncertainties raised by Sabbatino, see Louis
Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power of the Federal Courts: Sabbatino, 64 Colum. L
Rev. 805 (1964) [hereinafter Henkin, The Foreign Affairs Power].
110. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 6.2.4, at 350 (2d ed. 1994)
("Sabbatino still stands for the important proposition that in cases related to foreign
affairs, federal courts may fashion federal common law."); Martin H. Redish, Federal
Jurisdiction: Tensions in the Allocation of Judicial Power 125 (2d ed. 1990) (stating
that Sabbatino recognized "the power of the federal judiciary to create federal com-
mon law in the field of international relations").
111. See, e.g., Harold G. Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Common Law in
Private International Matters, 5 Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 133, 159-73 (1971) [hereinafter
Maier, The Bases and Range of Federal Conunon Law].
112. Stephen B. Burbank, Federal Judgments Law: Sources of Authority and
Sources of Rules, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1551, 1577 (1992); see also Curtis A. Bradley, Territo-
rial Intellectual Property Rights in an Age of Globalism, 37 Va. J. Int'l L 505. 550-52
(1997) [hereinafter Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights] (making a similar
point).
113. See Jack Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Relations, and Federalism, 83 Va.
L. Rev. 1617 (1997).
114. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 860-70.
115. D'Oench, Duhme & Co., Inc. v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp., 315 U.S. 447, 472
(1942) (Jackson, J., concurring) (emphasis added); see also Neuman, supra note 5, at
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relevant today mainly with respect to the new CIL of human rights.
The primary source of the CIL of human rights is the multilateral
human rights treaties.1 16 As we noted above, however, the political
branches have sought, through non-ratification or through ratification
conditioned by RUDs, to ensure that these international human rights
treaties do not apply as domestic federal law and do not preempt in-
consistent state law.1 17 This means that the federal political branches
have declared, contrary to the modern position, that a principal source
of the CIL of human rights should not be considered a source of fed-
eral law. The logic of post-Erie federal common law, even under a
broad reading of Sabbatino, does not permit federal courts to do via
federal common law what the political branches have clearly prohib-
ited in their conditional assent to these treaties. This is especially true
given that, as the Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized, federal
court deference to political branch wishes should be at its apex in this
foreign relations context." 8 As a result, even the broadest possible
reading of Sabbatino fails to support the modern position with respect
to the new CIL. None of our fellow panelists has addressed this dis-
381 ("Federal common law is made within the framework of existing federal statutes,
and not in contradiction to it."). One consequence of this is that the federal common
law of foreign relations remains subject to congressional revision. Thus, for example,
Congress overruled Sabbatino's act of state holding. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994)
(declaring that an act of state doctrine shall not prevent U.S. courts presented with "a
claim of title or other right to property" from inquiring into the validity of foreign
expropriations of such property under international law), constitutionality upheld,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957, 971-73 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), affd, 383
F.2d 166, 178-83 (2d Cir. 1967).
116. See Henkin, Politics and Values, supra note 40, at 36; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 1, at 832, 839-40; Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of
the Rights of Individuals Rather than States, 32 Am. U. L. Rev. 1, 12 (1982) [hereinaf-
ter Sohn, The New International Law].
117. See supra notes 50-52 & accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steamship Corp.,
333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (stating that foreign policy decisions "are wholly confided by
our Constitution to the political departments of the government, Executive and Legis-
lative"); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918) ("The conduct of the
foreign relations of our Government is committed by the Constitution to the Execu-
tive and Legislative-'the political'-Departments of the Government .... ). We are
baffled by Neuman's oblique suggestion that our thesis has a kinship with the pro-
posed Bricker Amendment. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 385. That Amendment,
which had various versions, would have (among other things) limited the power of the
Senate to consent to self-executing treaties. See Duane Tananbaum, The Bricker
Amendment Controversy 32-48, 221-23 (1988). Our thesis does not in any way entail
these or any other limitations on the Senate's power. To the contrary, our thesis urges
respect for the Senate's and the President's consistent exercise of their constitutional
prerogatives to condition assent to these human rights treaties on the exclusion of
these treaty norms from domestic federal law. By ignoring and circumventing these
exercises of the Senate's treaty power, it is the modern position, not us, that attempts
to diminish the power of the Senate.
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positive argument against judicial incorporation of the new CIL of
human rights.119
3. The Rise of the Modern Position
Much of Neuman's article is devoted to the claim that our account
of the recent rise of the modem position is "badly misinformed.' 12
He says that we "assert[] that the Reporters [of the Restatement
(Third)] misled the American Law Institute into adopting an ap-
proach supported only by academic commentary"' 21 and that the ALI
was "subordinated to academic fiat."'" He further asserts that our
critique of the modem position is "embedded in a bizarre conspiracy
theory."'1 3
Neuman has distorted our account. We did not say that the acad-
emy "misled" or "subordinated" anyone, or that the rise of the mod-
em position resulted from a "conspiracy." Nor did we impugn the
motives of those who claimed in 1980 that it was well settled that CIL,
including the new CIL of human rights, had the status of federal law.
We acknowledged that, by 1980, the modern position had the support
of some prominent academics and, based on an a-historical reading of
The Paquete Habana, combined with a casual reading of Sabbatino,
appeared plausible. 24 Our claim regarding the rise of modem posi-
tion was, and is, simply that its adoption in 1980 by both the ALI and
the Second Circuit in Filartiga was not supported by decisional au-
thority and was not accompanied by substantial debate regarding its
dramatic consequences for domestic legal governance.2'
Here is a brief summary of the historical record: In 1965, the Re-
statement (Second) correctly observed-after expressly considering
the significance of Sabbatino'2 6-that the domestic legal status of CIL
was "not settled."' 7 In 1980, however, the Tentative Draft of the Re-
statement (Third) proclaimed that CIL's status as domestic federal law
119. Neuman comes closest to addressing this argument when he states that the
argument "deserves exploration with greater precision and documentation" than we
have provided, and raises several questions about it. Neuman, supra note 5, at 387 &
n.78.
120. Neuman, supra note 5, at 377.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 378.
123. Id. at 371.
124. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1. at 874.
125. See id at 827-38.
126. The Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Second), promulgated in 1962, did not
contain any statement about the domestic legal status of CIL This draft required
revision after the 1964 Sabbatino decision. See 41 A.LI. Proc. 21, 57-58. The final
version of the Restatement (Second) contained the new Reporters' Note 2 to Section
3, which was not contained in the 1962 draft, and which stated that CIL's domestic
status was "not settled."
127. Restatement (Second), supra note 103. § 3 reporters' note 2.
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"had now been established" 12 and that "courts have declared" that
CIL is supreme federal law. The Restatement, however, did not cite a
single decision since the publication of the Restatement (Second) in
support of these views. The final 1987 version of the Restatement
(Third) did cite one of Chief Reporter Henkin's law review articles in
support of the modern position. 2 9 But that article cited only the 1980
Tentative Draft of the Restatement (Third) for the very proposition-
"general agreement" that CIL was federal law-for which it was being
cited in the final version of the Restatement (Third). 3 ° This is what we
referred to as "pure bootstrapping" 131-and that is exactly what it
was.
Although the Restatement (Third) itself failed to cite supporting de-
cisions issued after the Restatement (Second), Neuman has found one
decision in the 1965-1980 period that he claims the Restatement
(Third) could have cited-the Second Circuit's decision in Fiocconi v.
Attorney General.3 This decision declined to apply CIL, and,
although it did appear to assume that CIL was judicially enforcea-
ble,1 33 it never considered CIL's status in the U.S. legal system. This
single, uncertain dictum certainly does not demonstrate what Neuman
refers to as a "widely held conclusion, shared by judges" in 1980 in
support of the modern position. 34 Similarly, had the Restatement
128. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States (Ten-
tative Draft No. 1 1980), pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note at 40-41.
129. See Restatement (Third), supra note 6, pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note at 42
(citing Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 Mich. L. Rev. 1555
(1984)).
130. Henkin, International Law as Law, supra note 14, at 1559-60 & n.22.
131. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 836.
132. 462 F.2d 475 (2d Cir. 1972). Neuman also cites the Nixon Administration's
amicus curiae brief in Republic of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698
(N.Y. 1969), which argued in the context of consular immunity that CIL was federal
law. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 377. But this brief, which obviously is not a judicial
precedent and thus does not support the Restatement (Third)'s claims, shows only that
the modem position was plausible enough after Sabbatino to be invoked when it
suited the Executive's ends. Later Executives would similarly embrace or reject the
modern position in amicus briefs as it suited their political needs. Thus, for example,
the Reagan Administration largely disavowed the modem position in its brief in the
Marcos litigation in the Ninth Circuit. See Brief for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae at 3-5, 9-10, 12, Trajano v. Marcos, 978 F.2d 493 (9th Cir. July 10, 1989) (No. 86-
2448). Moreover, there obviously has not been Executive support for the proposition,
advanced by a number of proponents of the modem position, that the Executive does
not have the authority to violate CIL. Indeed, the Executive has refused to comply
with CIL in a number of prominent cases in recent years. See, e.g., United States v.
Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655 (1992) (involving the abduction of foreign citizen);
Garcia-Mir v. Meese, 788 F.2d 1446 (11th Cir. 1986) (involving the detention of un-
documented aliens).
133. See Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 479 n.7.
134. Neuman, supra note 5, at 378. In addition to being dicta, the court's interna-
tional law analysis in Fiocconi rested on a premise that appears to have since been
rejected by the Supreme Court. The issue for the court in Fiocconi was whether addi-
tional criminal charges that had been filed against two defendants after they had been
extradited to the United States should have been dismissed pursuant to the "specialty
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(Third) bothered to cite Fiocconi, the decision would not have sup-
ported its claim that, since 1965, "a different view [about the domestic
status of CIL] has prevailed."'35 Nor would it have supported its as-
sertion that "[t]he courts have held that ... federal determinations
and interpretations of customary international law are also supreme
over state law."' 36 Even today we cannot find a single decision that
squarely holds that CIL is federal law within the meaning of the
Supremacy Clause. 37
Neuman also invokes the Filartiga decision, which was decided the
same year as the publication of the first Tentative Draft of the Restate-
ment (Third). This decision did, of course, endorse the modem posi-
tion. The final version of the Restatement (Third), however, never
cited this decision for the domestic legal status of CIL. This may be
because Filartiga's endorsement of the modern position rested on the
premise that CIL had historically been treated as federal common
law,'38 whereas the Restatement (Third) correctly acknowledged that
doctrine," which, when it applies, precludes prosecution of a person who has been
extradited for an offense other than the one for which the person was extradited. The
court noted that, if the matter were res nova, it might well hold that the issue was "not
a matter proper for judicial cognizance," since the additional charges did not violate
any statute or treaty. Fiocconi, 462 F.2d at 477. The court, however, thought itself
bound to consider the claim because of an 1886 Supreme Court decision, United States
v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), which it construed as holding that the specialty doc-
trine is judicially enforceable as a matter of CIL or federal common law. Fiocconi, 462
F.2d at 478-79. The court's premise-that the specialty doctrine recognized in Rau-
scher was a matter of CIL or federal common law-appears to have been rejected, at
least implicitly, by the Supreme Court in United States v. Alarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655 (1992). There, both the majority and the dissent characterized Rauscher as having
interpreted an extradition treaty, not as having announced some independent princi-
ple of CIL or federal common law. See id. at 659; see also id. at 675 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
135. Restatement (Third), supra note 6, pt. I, ch. 2, introductory note at 42 (empha-
sis added).
136. Id., § 1, reporters' note 5, at 14 (emphasis added).
137. Neuman also contends that, while "[t]he court's reasoning may be susceptible
to different interpretations," the New York Court of Appeals recognized in Republic
of Argentina v. City of New York, 250 N.E.2d 698 (N.Y. 1969), that "it applies custom-
ary international law by obligation and not... by choice." Neuman, supra note 5, at
377 n.36. The court in that case, however, never clearly explained its views concern-
ing the status of CIL, probably because the principal dispute in that case concerned
the content of CIL, not its status. See Argentina, 250 N.E.2d at 699. The court's cita-
tion of pre-Erie decisions suggests that it may have had something in mind similar to
general common law. See i. at 700. In any event, the CIL applied in that case has
little current relevance to domestic litigation, since consular immunity is regulated by
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, to which the United States is now a
party. See Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Dis-
putes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261. Approximately 158 nations have
ratified the Convention. Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General,
United Nations, New York (ST/LEG/SER.E), as available on http'JlVww.un.org/
DeptslTreaty on Oct. 28, 1997. Although it is conceivable that a case could arise in-
volving the immunity of a consulate not covered by the Convention, there has not
been even one such case in U.S. courts.
138. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980).
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CIL was treated as general common law before Erie.'39 Despite the
questionable premise of the Filartiga decision, a number of courts
have relied on Filartiga for the modern position with very little scru-
tiny of its reasoning. 140 And neither Filartiga nor its progeny have
focused on the implications for domestic lawmaking processes of as-
signing federal common law status to CIL. We described the rise of
the modern position as characterized by this sort of insufficient delib-
eration, not by deception.14 1
While we did not claim and do not believe that the modern position
resulted from a "coup,' 4 we do believe that Neuman significantly
understates the influence of the American academy on the enforce-
ment of human rights law in the United States. This influence has at
least two dimensions. 143 First, American academics have played an
important role in the development of the new CIL, through their par-
ticipation in international institutions as well as through the writing of
treatises and law review articles. 4 4 Academic influence has been so
substantial that Professor Sohn, one of the Reporters for the Restate-
ment (Third) and a leading human rights commentator, observed re-
cently that "states really never make international law on the subject
of human rights," but rather "[i]t is made by the people that care; the
professors, the writers of textbooks and casebooks, and the authors of
articles in leading international law journals."' 145
139. See Restatement (Third), supra note 6, ch. 2, introductory note at 41.
140. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 246 (2d Cir. 1995); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 193 (D. Mass. 1995); Fernandez v. Wilkinson, 505 F. Supp.
787, 798 (D. Kan. 1980). But cf. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 801
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J., concurring) (criticizing Filartiga's logic but not directly
questioning the view that CIL is federal common law). Neuman acknowledges that
Filartiga and its progeny "would have been more scholarly if they had accurately por-
trayed the stage-by-stage evolution of U.S. approaches to international law," but he
defends Filartiga's reasoning as an "attempt[ ] to synthesize cases from all periods of
U.S. history." Neuman, supra note 5, at 379-80. We fail to see how a fundamental
misunderstanding about history constitutes a proper synthesis of history.
141. It is against the baseline of this mischaracterization of our earlier article that
Neuman asserts that in this Article we "distance [ourselves] from the accusations that
[the earlier article] made about the drafting of the Third Restatement." Neuman,
supra note 5, at 388. We did not say what he says we did in our first article, and we
have not changed our views here.
142. Neuman, supra note 5, at 377-78.
143. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 875-76.
144. See Janis, supra note 48, at 51-52, 79-84. As Professor Janis notes, "the deci-
sions of judges.., and the doctrines of scholars have played a surprisingly important
part in the development of international law." Id. at 79; see also, e.g., David Massey,
Note, How the American Law Institute Influences Customary Law: The Reasonable-
ness Requirement of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, 22 Yale J. Int'l L. 419
(1997) (explaining the predominant role of academics in the development of the rea-
sonableness standard typically stated to be a CIL limitation on the extraterritorial
application of a nation's laws).
145. Louis B. Sohn, Sources of International Law, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 399,
399 (1995/96) [hereinafter Sohn, Sources].
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Second, academic commentators have almost uniformly endorsed
the modem position. They have done so through their involvement in
drafting the influential Restatement (Third) as well as through writing
numerous law review articles proclaiming the modern position as set-
tled doctrine. In addition, amicus curiae briefs and affidavits written
by academic proponents of the modern position have now become a
staple of international human rights litigation. 4 6 Moreover, some
scholars have been testifying in such cases as expert witnesses, and not
only about the content of CIL but also about its status in the U.S.
legal system. 47 The views of academic commentators may be particu-
larly influential in this context, given the relative unfamiliarity of U.S.
judges with international law as well as the traditional deference
courts have paid to scholars concerning international law issues.' 48
B. Democracy
Our earlier work maintained that judicial federalization of CIL
without political branch authorization is inconsistent with American
constitutional democracy on two grounds. 149 The first concerns the
non-American source of the CIL that the modern position obliges
courts to apply as federal law. This law, as Professor Henkin has
noted, "is not made by the United States and through its governmen-
tal institutions alone but by them together with many foreign govern-
ments in a process to which the United States contributes only in an
uncertain way and to an indeterminate degree."'" 0  The second
ground concerns the application of this law against states by federal
courts without the filter of constitutional or legislative authorization.
We argued that this was inconsistent with the Supreme Court's mod-
em federalism jurisprudence, especially in the context of the new CIL,
which implicates traditional state prerogatives.'15 The Supreme
Court's abandonment in the 1980s of federalism as a substantive limit
on federal power was justified by the premise that state interests were
protected in Congress by the "internal safeguards of the political pro-
146. There are many examples. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 235-36 (2d
Cir. 1995) (numerous amicus curiae briefs submitted to the court, many of them bear-
ing the names of law professors); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 185 (D. Mass.
1995) (citing joint affidavit from 27 international law scholars); Forti v. Suarez-Mason,
694 F. Supp. 707, 709 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (noting affidavits from eight interna-
tional law scholars); see generally Lillich, The Growing Importance, supra note 57, at
23-24 (referring to the "ubiquitous... 'Affidavit of International Law Scholars' that
has become the norm in recent human rights cases").
147. See Harold G. Maier, The Role of Experts in Proving International Human
Rights Law in Domestic Courts: A Commentary, 25 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L 205, 217-
19 (1995/96) [hereinafter Maier, The Role of Experts].
148. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 874-76.
149. See id at 857-59, 868-69.
150. Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 508 n.16, see also Bradley & Gold-
smith, supra note 1, at 850.
151. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 868-70.
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cess."'152 But this political process justification for federal intrusion
into state prerogatives does not apply when federal courts apply CIL
as federal common law in the absence of political branch
authorization. 5
3
The manner in which U.S. courts apply customary international
human rights law raises a third type of democratic concern not ad-
dressed in our earlier work. In the typical case, a U.S. court applies
CIL to regulate the mistreatment abroad of one alien by another alien
acting under color of foreign law.154 The United States may be the
only country in the world that applies customary international human
rights law in this fashion.155 Even assuming that the defendant-alien's
country has consented to this law on the international plane, there is
no evidence that this consent extends to domestic enforcement in the
United States or any other country. Indeed, it is the absence of an
agreed-upon customary law of domestic enforcement that requires
federal courts in so many human rights cases to imply a cause of action
as a matter of U.S. law.'56 The point is even more apparent with re-
spect to the numerous remedies created by federal courts in these
cases. On remand in Filartiga, for example, the district court created
and awarded a punitive damages remedy that was not contemplated
by either international law, Paraguayan law, or enacted United States
law. 1
57
It is against this background that one must consider Neuman's argu-
ment that judicial federalization of CIL is democratic because it is
152. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 556 (1985).
153. The Supreme Court's recent reinvigoration of federalism limits on federal
power only strengthens this argument. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 117 S. Ct.
2365 (1997); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501
U.S. 452 (1991). These decisions may represent a retreat from the "political process"
theory of Garcia. See John Yoo, The Judicial Safeguards of Federalism, 70 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 201 (1997). The point remains, however, that to the extent that the political
process rationale justifies any federal intrusion on state interests, it does so only with
respect to political branch enactments and not to pure federal common law. See Mer-
rill, supra note 32, at 17.
154. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
155. See Ralph G. Steinhardt, Fulfilling the Promise of Filartiga: Litigating Human
Rights Claims Against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 20 Yale J. Int'l L. 65, 101 (1995)
("[N]o other nation invites such cases into its courts."); Beth Stephens, Litigating,
supra note 58, at 200 ("International human rights litigation will greatly increase in
value if it is conducted in many countries around the world, not just in the United
States.").
156. See Beth Stephens & Michael Ratner, International Human Rights Litigation
in U.S. Courts 112-18 (1996); Steinhardt, supra note 155, at 72-82; see also William R.
Casto, The Federal Courts' Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed in Violation of
the Law of Nations, 18 Conn. L. Rev. 467, 475 (1986) ("There is serious doubt ...
whether international law, unassisted by domestic law, creates a tort remedy that may
be invoked in domestic courts by private individuals.").
157. Filartiga, 577 F. Supp. at 860; see generally Steinhardt, supra note 155, at 93-98,
101-03 (explaining that in ATS cases many remedial issues like damages have been
governed by federal common law because of "lack of international precedent" and
proposing international treaty to fill this gap).
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subject to congressional revision. 5 This argument first of all proves
too much. It would justify the creation of any (non-constitutional)
federal common law, including the Swift-ian general common law ex-
pressly abrogated in Erie, since all such law can be overruled by Con-
gress. Moreover, Neuman's argument runs counter to the normal
constitutional presumption that state law governs in the face of polit-
ical branch silence.'59 The Supreme Court's reversal of this presump-
tion in the dormant commerce clause context has been justified on the
ground that the federal political branches by themselves are incapable
of protecting important federal prerogatives. 60 Neuman has made no
such argument in the context of CIL, however, and there is little basis
for one. 61 Finally, if judicial common law-making is constitutionally
improper-as we think it is in this area-it should not be allowed to
occur in the first place.' 62
158. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 387; see also Brilmayer, supra note 18, at 334,
336; Michael J. Glennon, Process Versus Policy in Foreign Relations: Foreign Affairs
and the United States Constitution, 95 Mich. L. Rev. 1542, 1553 (1997) (book review)
[hereinafter Glennon, Process Versus Policy]; Henkin, International Law as Law,
supra note 14, at 1566. Not all proponents of the modem position even agree that
Congress can in fact overrule judicial applications of CIL See supra note 20.
159. See Merrill, supra note 32, at 37.
160. See Julian Eule, Laying the Dormant Commerce Clause to Rest, 91 Yale i.J.
425, 435 (1982); Ernest J. Brown, The Open Economy Justice Frankfurter and the
Position of the Judiciary, 67 Yale L.i. 219, 222 (1957); Jesse H. Choper, The Scope of
National Power Vis-a-Vis the States: The Dispensability of Judicial Review, 86 Yale
LJ. 1552, 1586 (1977).
161. See Goldsmith, supra note 113.
162. See Merrill, supra note 32, at 22. Neuman also contends that if the modern
position is undemocratic on the federal level, then allowing state courts to apply CIL
without legislative authorization would be equally undemocratic. See Neuman, supra
note 5, at 383-84. As noted above, it is not at all clear that our position would lead to
independent applications of CIL by the state courts. Nor are we endorsing such a role
for these courts. If state governments did decide to allow their courts to act in this
way, however, there is probably nothing in the federal constitution that would prevent
them from doing so. State institutional arrangements, including the relative power of
state courts vis-a-vis state political branches, generally are not a matter of federal
constitutional concern. Thus, for example, many state courts are authorized to pro-
vide advisory opinions, but "it is firmly established that federal courts cannot [do so]."
Chemerinsky, supra note 110, § 2.2, at 48. More significantly, state courts may engage
in general common-lawmaking, but the federal courts have been disallowed from do-
ing so since 1938. See City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 312 (1981) ("Federal
courts, unlike state courts, are not general common-law courts and do not possess a
general power to develop and apply their own rules of decision."); cf Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64,78 (1938) ("[W]hether the law of the State shall be declared by
its Legislature in a statute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of
federal concern."). Like these issues, the legitimacy of state court applications of CIL
is a matter of state constitutional law, which may or may not allow for it. Neuman is
therefore incorrect in asserting that the "same problem" associated with the modern
position also exists with respect to state court applications of CIL Neuman, supra
note 5, at 383; cf Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 112 (not-
ing similar points to explain differential treatment of extraterritoriality of federal and
state statutes). This is not to argue that independent application of CIL by state
judges is democratic; at least for unelected state judges, our democracy concerns
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The Supreme Court recently rejected arguments very similar to
Neuman's in a related foreign relations context. In Barclays Bank v.
Franchise Tax Board of California,163 the Court considered a chal-
lenge under the dormant commerce clause to the constitutionality of
California's "worldwide combined reporting" method for taxing mul-
tinational corporations. This state law had provoked enormous diplo-
matic controversy with the United States' closest trading partners and
had been opposed in numerous executive pronouncements."64 The
Court nevertheless rejected the claim. It explained that concerns
about foreign sovereign retaliation were "directed at the wrong fo-
rum" because courts lack the power "to balance a particular risk of
retaliation against the sovereign right of the United States as a whole
to let the states tax as they please.' 1 65 The Court also dismissed as
irrelevant the California scheme's inconsistency with "Executive
Branch communications [including amicus briefs] that express federal
policy but lack the force of law.' 1 66 What mattered to the Court was
that no validly enacted federal law had preempted the state action.' 67
Similar reasoning can be found in the Court's recent federal common
law decisions.' 68
The democratic pedigree of the modern position contrasts sharply
with the processes by which the other principal form of international
law-treaties-are incorporated into federal law. 169 Treaties are ne-
gotiated by the Executive and generally take the form of written docu-
ments. Formal ratification under Article II requires both the
agreement of the Executive and the "advice and consent" of two-
might argue against judicial activism in applying CIL at the state level. But this would
hardly constitute an argument for the modern position.
163. 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
164. Id. at 324 n.22, 328-29.
165. Id. at 328 (quoting Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S.
159, 194 (1983)).
166. Id. at 330.
167. See id. at 331 ("[W]e leave it to Congress-whose voice, in this area, is the
Nation's-to evaluate whether the national interest is best served by tax uniformity,
or state autonomy."). Stephens claims that this decision supports the modern position
because it shows that "in areas touching upon foreign affairs and international law,
great deference is paid to the political branches." Stephens, The Law of Our Land,
supra note 5, at 448 n.282. She does not explain how such deference, however, sup-
ports independent judicial authority to preempt state law-the very thing called for
by the modern position yet rejected in Barclays Bank. Moreover, Stephens fails to
consider the substantial empirical evidence, discussed above, that suggests that the
political branches do not want the new CIL to be automatically incorporated into
domestic law. In light of that evidence, deference to the political branches clearly cuts
against the modern position, not in favor of it.
168. See Atherton v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 666, 670-74 (1997); O'Melveny & Myers v.
FDIC, 512 U.S. 79, 87-89 (1994).
169. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 858-59.
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thirds of the Senate. 7 ' Even less formal "executive agreements" usu-
ally involve the concurrence of at least a majority of CongressY71
Moreover, neither formal treaties nor executive agreements are en-
forceable federal law unless they are "self-executing" in nature or are
accompanied by implementing federal legislation. 1 -
By contrast, CIL is unwritten and relatively amorphous. The date
and circumstances of its creation are often uncertain. And no formal
endorsement from this country's representatives is required in order
for it to have binding force on the international plane. Indeed, this
country can be bound by CIL concerning which it has taken no posi-
tion at all.1 73 Despite these features, which from the perspective of
domestic governance make CIL less democratic than treaties, the
modern position claims that all of CIL is automatically self-executing
federal law. Even more dramatically, this claim is made in the face of
a consistent refusal by the political branches to allow human rights
treaties, the source of much of the new CIL, to become self-executing
federal law. In our view, any defense of the modern position must
adequately explain this anomaly. None of our fellow panelists has
even attempted to do so.
C. States
Our earlier work concluded that federal courts should not apply
CIL as federal law without some authorization to do so by the federal
political branches. This view does not, as Neuman and Stephens ap-
pear to believe, require that CIL be a matter of state common law.174
Their error is to assume that (a) CIL must be enforceable by courts,
and (b) if it is not enforceable as federal law, it must be enforceable as
state law. They have provided no argument for (a), and (b) is wrong.
Under Erie, if CIL is not federal law, federal courts are not to apply it
unless they determine that it is part of state law. We suspect that in
most cases, states would rarely incorporate CIL into state law. In this
170. See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (stating that the President "shall have Power,
by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur").
171. See Loch K. Johnson, The Making of International Agreements (1984).
172. See Restatement (Third), supra note 6. § 111(3).
173. See id at pt. I, ch. 1, introductory note at 18 ("[States may be bound by a rule
of customary law that they did not participate in making if they did not clearly dissoci-
ate themselves from it during the process of development.").
174. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 382 (referring to our "State law proposal" and
our "[r]educ[tion of] customary international law to State common law"); id. at 382
(asking "which State's common law" would govern under our proposal); hiL at 383
(describing our "proposed solution" as "enforcement of customary international law
as State common law"); Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 395
(describing our argument as one that would make CIL "part of state law"); but ef
Neuman, supra note 5, at 388 n.80 (noting that under our proposal, "State courts
would be free to adopt, reject, or impose their own vies of customary international
law").
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circumstance, CIL simply would not be a rule of decision in federal
court.
The claim that states have even a potential role in interpreting CIL
unless and until Congress acts to preempt them may seem surprising.
But it should not. States have always played an important role in en-
forcing U.S. obligations under CIL, even with respect to inter-national
affairs.175 And this traditional CIL is not even what is at stake in de-
bates over the modern position. As explained above, most of the
traditional CIL that is relevant to domestic litigation has been federal-
ized by the political branches in treaties and statutes.
With respect to what is really at stake in the modern debates-the
enforcement of international human rights law-a potential role for
states seems even less problematic. Many human rights issues-for
example, the legality of the juvenile death penalty-fall within tradi-
tional state prerogatives that should be interrupted, if at all, only by
the states themselves or the federal political branches. In addition, if
the states did incorporate international human rights norms into their
law, this would only make them more rights-protecting than the fed-
eral government, something that the Constitution allows in other con-
texts.1 76 In this connection, we are surprised by Stephens's assertion
that our position entails "a quite radical view of state jurisdiction. "177
Assume, for example, that a state interpreted CIL to prohibit discrim-
ination on the basis of sexual preference and enacted a state statute to
incorporate this international law into state law. Assuming no conflict
with the Constitution or a federal statute, there is nothing obviously
"radical" about allowing the state such authority. 178
Neuman and Stephens object that states cannot incorporate or vio-
late international law because such tasks are exclusive foreign rela-
tions prerogatives of the federal government. 179  This is the
conventional rhetoric. When looked at closely, however, it does not
even hold true for traditional foreign relations functions. The Consti-
tution limits states' roles in a few, specifically-defined foreign affairs
contexts, as listed in Article I, Section 10. And it gives the political
branches broad powers to preempt the states in areas relating to for-
eign affairs. 8 ' The Supreme Court's statements about federal exclu-
175. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 825-26; see also Henkin, Foreign
Affairs, supra note 12, at 150-51.
176. See Bradley, The Status of Customary International Law, supra note 23.
177. Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note 5, at 397.
178. For a different explanation of how independent state authority to incorporate
international law might actually advance the cause of human rights, see Spiro, supra
note 52.
179. Neuman, supra note 5, at 375-77; Stephens, The Law of Our Land, supra note
5, at 438-41.
180. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (granting Congress the power to "collect Taxes,
Duties, Imposts and Excises, [and] to... provide for the common Defence"); id. cl. 3
(granting Congress the power to "regulate Commerce with foreign Nations"); id. cl. 4
(granting Congress the power to "establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization"); id. cl.
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sivity in foreign relations that Neuman and Stephens cite were all
made in cases in which the Court was upholding federal political
branch enactments.81 They do not stand for the much different idea
that federal courts can on their own prerogative preempt state law
under a foreign affairs rationale. Such a power was asserted for the
first time in the 1960s,11 and, as we said above, the legitimate scope of
this power is highly contested.
Neuman's and Stephens's "foreign affairs exclusion" position makes
even less sense with respect to the new CIL that is centrally at issue
here. This new CIL regulates intra-national affairs traditionally regu-
lated by states in the absence of federal legislation. Even if there were
a judicially-enforceable preemption for state actions on the interna-
tional plane, it requires more argument than Neuman and Stephens
have provided to show that a state's treatment of its own citizens is an
action on the international plane. Moreover, it makes little sense
under a foreign relations preemption rationale for courts to apply this
customary international human rights law against the states, especially
since, as mentioned above, the political branches have taken pains to
ensure that the treaties upon which this law is based do not apply as
domestic federal law.
D. Executive Officials
As noted above, one of the possible implications of the modern po-
sition is that CIL is judicially enforceable against the President. There
has been substantial debate among proponents of the modern position
5 (granting Congress the power to "regulate the Value ... of foreign Coin"); i. cl. 10
(granting Congress the power to "define and punish ... [o]ffences against the Law of
Nations"); id. cl. 11 (granting Congress the power to "'declare War, grant Letters of
Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water"); id.
cls. 12-13 (granting Congress the power to "raise and support Armies" and "provide
and maintain a Navy"); id. cl. 14 (granting Congress the power to regulate -land and
naval Forces"); id. cl. 16 (granting Congress the power to organize, arm, discipline,
and train the militia); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (vesting the executive power in the Presi-
dent); id. § 2, cl. 1 (providing that the President is the commander-in-chief of the
armed forces); id. cl. 2 (granting the President the power, "by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur"); id (granting the President the power, "by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, [to] appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
suls"); id. cl. 3 (providing that the President "shall take Care that the Laws be faith-
fully executed").
181. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 375-76; Stephens. The Law of Our Land, supra
note 5, at 438-41. Thus, for example, the Court in Hines v. Da-idowitz, 312 U.S. 52
(1941), held that a state immigration statute was preempted by a similar federal stat-
ute, id at 56; the Court in United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942), and United States
v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937), held that an Executive Agreement preempted state
property laws; and the Court upheld a statutory delegation of power to the President
in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
182. See Henkin, Foreign Affairs, supra note 12, at 163; Bradley & Goldsmith,
supra note 1, at 864; Hans A. Linde, A New Foreign-Relations Restraint on American
States: Zschernig v. Miller, 28 Z. Ausi. Off. Recht Vokerr. 594, 602-03 (1968).
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over this issue.183 On the one hand, the Constitution obligates the
President to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." '184 If
CIL has the status of federal common law, it may be part of the
"Laws" covered by this obligation. On the other hand, dicta in The
Paquete Habana suggests that CIL is not judicially enforceable against
the President. 85 And such judicial enforcement would seem to raise
special separation-of-powers concerns, since the President needs flexi-
bility in representing the United States on the international plane and
plays a central role in articulating the U.S. position concerning the
content of CIL.'86
In our prior work, we briefly described this debate and emphasized
that the claim that CIL is judicially enforceable against the President,
like the other implications of the modern position, depends on the
proposition that CIL has the status of federal law.187 Neuman con-
tends that our discussion of this issue "collapses all relevant distinc-
tions,"""' apparently because we did not distinguish between low-level
and high-level executive officials and among various presidential acts.
Some proponents of the modern position have made such distinctions
in evaluating the relationship between the Executive and CIL.'89
Such distinctions, however, are relevant only if one accepts the mod-
ern position claim that CIL is federal law. If it is not federal law, it is
not by itself binding-as a matter of U.S. law-on even low-level ex-
ecutive officials and is not judicially enforceable with respect to any
presidential acts. Since we were not advocating the modern position,
the distinctions referred to by Neuman were not relevant to our
analysis.
Neuman also contends that, by not focusing on these distinctions,
we have missed "one of the central difficulties" with our analysis,
namely that it "would free not only the President, but also federal
officers at every level to commit violations [of CIL]."' 90 This conten-
183. See supra note 19.
184. U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
185. See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900) (noting that CIL is judi-
cially enforceable "where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative
act or judicial decision"); see also id. at 708 (stating that courts must "give effect to"
customary international law "in the absence of any treaty or other public act of their
own government in relation to the matter"); see also Restatement (Third), supra note
6, § 115, reporters' note 3 (discussing this language).
186. See Restatement (Third), supra note 6, § 112 cmt. c; Henkin, International Law
as Law, supra note 14, at 1568-69; Weisburd, The Executive Branch, supra note 76, at
1253-56. The President also may need flexibility in this area in order to help bring
about changes in CIL. See Trimble, A Revisionist View, supra note 42, at 711-12.
187. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 845-46.
188. Neuman, supra note 5, at 381.
189. See, e.g., Jonathan I. Charney, May the President Violate Customary Interna-
tional law?: The Power of the Executive Branch of the United States Government to
Violate Customary International Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 913, 921-22 (1986); Henkin,
The Constitution and United States Sovereignty, supra note 20, at 884.
190. Neuman, supra note 5, at 382.
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tion overlooks a crucial fact: The conduct of low-level executive offi-
cials is already subject to federal control by the President and
Congress. The domestic regulatory, statutory, and other limitations
on the actions of executive officials undoubtedly reflect, and will con-
tinue to reflect, principles of international law. 9' The only issue is
whether the judiciary should have independent lawmaking authority to
regulate the compliance of executive officials with international law.
The judiciary lacks such independent authority with respect to all
other areas of executive law compliance, and Neuman has not ex-
plained why special judicial power is needed here. Neuman misses
this point because he mistakenly assumes that the compliance of exec-
utive officials with international law is dependent on federal judicial
lawmaking. 19
2
E. Traditional CIL
As noted above, our critique focused on the new CIL. We did,
however, consider the relevance of our thesis for traditional CIL."'
Nevertheless, Neuman says our analysis "neglects the effect of deny-
ing federal character to the 'old' [CIL]." 194 Neuman appears to be
suggesting that it would be unthinkable to deny federal common law
191. Consider, for example, the recently-enacted War Crimes Act, which authorizes
the punishment of war crimes if the "person committing such breach or the victim of
such breach is a member of the Armed Forces of the United States or a national of
the United States." 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (Supp. 1997). Interestingly, even the violation of
CIL at issue in The Paquete Habana-the seizure of a fishing vessel by a Navy admi-
ral-may not have required independent judicial lawmaking for its correction, given
that the President had announced that the military was to comply with international
law in the U.S. conflict with Spain. See 175 U.S. 677, 712 (1900): see also Michael J.
Glennon, May the President Violate Customary International Law?: Can the President
Do No Wrong?, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 923, 923 n.6 (1986) [hereinafter Glennon, May the
President Violate Customary International Law?] (making this point).
192. Neuman also argues that CIL must be federal law so that judges can use it to
regulate their own conduct. See Neuman, supra note 5, at 383-85. We are not exactly
sure what conduct Neuman has in mind. The only example he provides is the decision
by a court whether to give immunity from suit to a consulate, something that, as noted
above, is already largely regulated by treaty. Other than immunity from suit, it is not
clear what sort of actions by judges themselves would implicate international law.
One possibility might be conducting a criminal prosecution against a foreign defend-
ant who has been abducted from another country. The Supreme Court, however, may
have already rejected the argument that CIL operates as a restraint on judicial con-
duct in that situation. See United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 666-70
(1992) (allowing trial against defendant abducted from Mexico); see also United
States v. Alvarez-Machain, 971 F.2d 310, 311 (9th Cir. 1992), as modified, 1992 U.S.
App. LEXIS 28367, *1-*2 (9th Cir. Nov. 3, 1992) (suggesting that the Supreme Court
may have foreclosed the CIL argument); The Suprene Court, 1991 Tenu; Leading
Cases, 106 Harv. L. Rev. 163, 322-23 (1992) ("[B]y chance or design. the Supreme
Court disposed of Alvarez-Machain's potentially viable customary international law
defense without analysis.").
193. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 869.
194. Neuman, supra note 5, at 372.
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status to traditional CIL and that we should therefore have exempted
such CIL from our analysis.
The lack of such an exemption in our earlier work was intentional.
Our position is that the judicial federalization of all CIL requires some
authorization from the Constitution or a federal statute. It is impor-
tant to keep in mind, however, that the authorization requirement has
little if any practical significance in connection with traditional CIL.
As explained above, the federal political branches appear to have in-
corporated into federal law most if not all of traditional CIL that is
likely to come up in domestic litigation. The debate about CIL's do-
mestic status in the last three decades has almost exclusively con-
cerned new, rather than traditional, CIL. It is significant that Neuman
can cite only hypothetical and academic examples of the need for a
federal common law of the traditional CIL.195 Within the real world,
gaps either have not appeared in the federal political branches' statu-
tory and treaty incorporations of the traditional CIL or courts have
not viewed the traditional CIL as a relevant source of law to fill such
gaps.1 96 As we noted above, this explains why the traditional CIL has
not been much discussed in debates about the modem position. It
also suggests that the political branches have, consistent with our view
of the way the world should work, done a fairly comprehensive job of
incorporating the traditional CIL that matters into federal law. Fi-
nally, it suggests that the justification for the modem position should
195. Neuman provides two hypothetical possibilities: the CIL of consular immunity
and the purported CIL limits on the extraterritorial application of state law. We
know of no decision in recent times that treats either of these CIL norms as a rule of
decision or defense in domestic litigation, and Neuman provides none.
196. The reason why the consular immunity problem has not arisen is that, as ex-
plained above, most nations of the world have ratified the Vienna Convention of Con-
sular Relations. The reasons for the apparent non-relevance of CIL limits on
extraterritorial jurisdiction are more complicated. First, the Permanent Court Inter-
national Justice famously viewed these limits to be weak in S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.),
1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10 (Sept. 7). The Restatement (Third) adopts a stronger
view of these limits, see Restatement (Third), § 403, but, as other commentators have
pointed out, the Restatement (Third)'s views on this issue may not reflect CIL. See
Phillip R. Trimble, The Supreme Court and International Law: The Demise of Restate-
ment Section 403, 89 Am. J. Int'l 53 (1995) [hereinafter Trimble, The Supreme Court
and International Law]. Second, CIL limits on extraterritorial jurisdiction might be
weaker than or co-extensive with federal constitutional limits on state extraterritorial
jurisdiction. See, e.g., Home Ins. Co. v. Dick, 281 U.S. 397, 343 (1930) (holding that
application of Texas law to an insurance contract made in Mexico and governing a
Mexican risk violates due process). Third, the Supreme Court has considered numer-
ous challenges in recent years to extraterritorial assertions of state and federal author-
ity without even suggesting that CIL might operate as a rule of decision in this area.
See Barclays Bank v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 315 (1994) (upholding Califor-
nia's worldwide unitary tax method claimed by many to violate CIL); Hartford Fire
Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 769 (1993) (upholding extraterritorial application
of U.S. antitrust law claimed by many to violate CIL); United States v. Alvarez
Machain, 504 U.S. 655, 699-700 (1992) (upholding the validity of the President's par-
ticipation in a foreign abduction which was claimed by many to violate CIL).
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not rise or fall on the basis of purely hypothetical situations involving
traditional CIL.
Of course, it is conceivable that in domestic litigation a CIL issue
might arise that is not plausibly governed by a federal treaty or stat-
ute. If this happens, there should be little to fear from a regime that
places the responsibility for deciding whether and how to federalize
this issue on the federal political branches. 97 This is, after all, the
normal presumption of our constitutional order. And, especially in
the context of traditional international law, there is absolutely no rea-
son to think the political branches cannot quickly and effectively re-
spond to such a rare circumstance. Not only can Congress quickly
respond to such issues, but in the foreign relations context the Presi-
dent has a number of constitutional lawmaking powers and lawmaking
powers delegated from Congress that he can employ in emergency
situations.19
197. Neuman says that we "give no serious attention" to the difference between the
traditional and the new CIL, and that we "avoid trying to understand the implica-
tions" of this hypothetical about CIL limits on state extraterritorial jurisdiction.
Neuman, supra note 5, at 392. We do not know what more we could do to respond to
Neuman's concerns and hypotheticals. We have made clear that the authorization
requirement applies to the new and traditional CIL alike; we have stated that this
requirement has little relevance to the traditional CIL because of the political
branches' comprehensive federalization of these matters; in support of this view we
have pointed out that the traditional CIL's domestic legal status has not arisen in any
decision in decades; we have specifically responded to his extraterritorial hypothetical
by pointing out many examples in which federal courts have not treated CIL limits on
extraterritorial jurisdiction as controlling in domestic litigation; we have acknowl-
edged that an issue concerning the traditional CIL could nevertheless conceivably
arise in domestic litigation; and we have made clear that we believe the responsibility
for federalization of any residual traditional CIL issues that might arise should rest
with the political branches, not the federal courts. One might disagree with our analy-
sis, but we do not believe the analysis "evidence[s] no effort to investigate what the
consequences of [our] proposal would be for the 'old' customary international law."
Id at 392.
198. Perhaps Congress's most sweeping delegation of lawmaking power to the
President is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act ("IEEPA"), 50
U.S.C. § 1701 (1991). By its terms, this statute is triggered only in the event of "any
unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial part
outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or economy of the
United States." Id. But this requirement has not in fact substantially limited the
scope of the statute, given that presidents "have declared national emergencies with
little regard to whether a real emergency has actually existed." Harold Hongju Koh &
John Choon Yoo, Dollar Diplomacy/Dollar Defense. The Fabric of Economics and
National Security Law, 26 Int'l Lawyer 715, 744 n.126 (1992). IEEPA enables the
President to respond quickly to suspend or invalidate state law that interferes with or
impedes the federal government's ability to conduct foreign affairs. The best known
example is the invocation of IEEPA by Presidents Carter and Reagan to lift state-lawjudicial attachments on Iranian assets and suspend private (state law) claims against
Iran as part of a deal to secure release of the hostages in Iran. See Dames & Moore v.
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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III. THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND THE TORTURE VICTIM
PROTECTION ACT
In our earlier work, we argued that courts should not apply CIL as
federal law unless the federal political branches authorized them to do
so. We did not, however, evaluate whether any particular political
branch enactments constitute sufficient authorization. 199 This subsidi-
ary issue is particularly relevant to the legal basis for international
human rights litigation in U.S. courts. The famous Filartiga decision
held that the CIL of human rights could be applied by courts even in
the absence of any political branch authorization. As we emphasized
in our earlier work, however, the requirement of political branch au-
thorization "would not necessarily spell the end for Filartiga-type"
human rights litigation.2" This is so, we explained, because the au-
thorization requirement might be satisfied by the Alien Tort Statute
("ATS"), or because Congress might incorporate portions of interna-
tional human rights law into federal law, as it did with respect to tor-
ture and extrajudicial killing in the Torture Victim Protection Act of
1991 ("TVPA"). 20 1
These arguments, if persuasive, are consistent with our thesis that
CIL must be grounded in enacted federal law. We analyze these argu-
ments in three steps. We first explain why rejection of the modern
position threatens Filartiga-type human rights litigation. We then ex-
amine whether the ATS authorizes courts to treat CIL as federal law
in human rights cases. Finally, we consider the extent to which the
TVPA does so. We conclude that there is little reason to think that
Congress has federalized international human rights law outside of the
TVPA's specific prohibitions on torture and extrajudicial killing. Con-
gress of course retains the prerogative to federalize other human
rights norms if it wishes.
A. The Problem
The watershed Filartiga decision exemplified a litigation structure
that would become typical of its progeny.2° In that case, aliens
brought suit in federal court to recover civil damages for acts commit-
199. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 869, 871-73.
200. Id. at 872.
201. See id. at 872-73.
202. Professor Koh has described Filartiga as the "Brown v. Board of Education" of
"transnational public law litigation." Koh, supra note 102, at 2366. The Filartiga opin-
ion describes itself as "a small but important step in the fulfillment of the ageless
dream to free all people from brutal violence." Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
890 (2d Cir. 1980). The opinion's author, Judge Kaufman, later wrote that the deci-
sion was "the latest development in an unprecedented growth of international con-
cern over the incidence of torture and other human-rights violations," and he
observed that "[t]he enunciation of humane norms of behavior by the global commu-
nity and the articulation of evolved norms of international law by the courts form the
ethical foundations for a more enlightened social order." Irving R. Kaufman, A Legal
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ted abroad by another alien in alleged violation of customary interna-
tional human rights law. The statutory basis for federal jurisdiction
was the ATS, which provides that "[t]he district courts shall have orig-
inal jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, commit-
ted in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." 3 But the necessary Article III basis for the exercise of fed-
eral judicial power was uncertain. The parties to the suit were not
diverse, and the court did not assume that the case arose under either
a treaty or federal statute.2 4 The court concluded that these circum-
stances were not fatal to jurisdiction, however, because Article III's
"arising under" clause is also satisfied by cases that arise under federal
common law.20 5 Asserting that "the law of nations . . . has always
been part of the federal common law," the court held that the plain-
tiffs' CIL claim arose under federal law for purposes of Article III.2"6
The court in Filartiga thus assumed that the ATS was a pure juris-
dictional statute that did not itself incorporate CIL into federal law
and whose constitutionality in cases between aliens depended on the
existence of an independently-derived federal common law of interna-
tional human rights law.207 If this reading of the ATS is correct, then a
rejection of the view that CIL is automatically federal common law
would appear to render human rights litigation under the ATS in Fi-
lartiga-type cases inconsistent with Article III and thus unconstitu-
tional.2 °8 It does not follow, however, that human rights litigation is
necessarily illegitimate, since it is possible that the ATS is more than
just a jurisdictional statute, or that the TVPA now provides sufficient
authorization for the Filartiga holding.
B. The ATS
There are basically two ways to interpret the ATS to authorize the
federalization of international human rights law.2-39 The first interpre-
Remedy for International Torture?, The New York Times, Sec. 6, p.44, clm. 1 (Nov. 9,
1980).
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1350. The statute was part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, § 9(b), 1
Stat. 73, 77. Between 1789 and 1980, courts had upheld jurisdiction under the ATS in
only two cases. See Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857, 863-65 (D. Md. 1961); Bolchos v.
Darrel, 3 Cas. 810, 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1,607). Since Filartiga. numerous courts
have upheld ATS jurisdiction.
204. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 887.
205. See Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 99-100 (1972).
206. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 885.
207. See id. at 887 (construing ATS "not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply
as opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by in-
ternational law").
208. See Anne-Marie Burley, The Alien Tort Statute and the Judiciary Act of 1789:
A Badge of Honor, 83 Am. J. Int'l L. 461, 468 (1989) [hereinafter Burley, The Alien
Tort Statute].
209. A third way is to view the ATS in alien-alien cases as an example of "protec-
tive jurisdiction." See Russell J. Weintraub, Establishing Incredible Events by Credible
Evidence: Civil Suits for Atrocities that Violate International Law, 62 Brook. L Rev.
1997]
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
tation would be that the ATS itself establishes a substantive federal
cause of action for violations of CIL. This would mean that a claim
brought pursuant to the ATS would "arise under" the ATS rather
than, as Filartiga concluded, under the federal common law of CIL.
Several courts have read the ATS to create a cause of action in this
fashion, although they have not tied this holding to the issue of the
ATS's constitutionality under Article Ill.21
The second interpretation views the ATS's jurisdictional grant not
to create a cause of action itself, but rather to authorize federal courts
to do so. On this view, ATS cases would arise under this congressio-
nally-authorized federal common law for purposes of Article III. The
obvious analogy here is the Supreme Court's decision in Lincoln
Mills, which implied federal common lawmaking powers from the
Taft-Hartley Act's grant of federal jurisdiction to decide disputes
under certain labor-management contracts. 2 I At least one federal
court, citing Lincoln Mills, appears to have adopted this reading of the
ATS. 212
Can the ATS plausibly be read to convert CIL into substantive fed-
eral law under either of these interpretations? As Professor Slaughter
(formerly Burley) has correctly noted, "definitive proof of the in-
tended purpose and scope of the [ATS] is impossible. '21 3 Nonethe-
less, the ATS's text, drafting history, and historical context may render
some constructions of the statute more plausible than others.
Although these sources do not provide a complete picture of what the
ATS was designed to do, they do provide powerful reasons to rule out
both the federal cause of action and Lincoln Mills interpretations out-
lined above.
The ATS was enacted by the First Congress as part of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. Its original language provided that federal district courts
"shall also have cognizance ... of all causes where an alien sues for a
tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United
States." ' 4 As Professor Casto has noted, "cognizance" was a term of
753 (1996). The theory of protective jurisdiction, which has never been accepted by
the Supreme Court, would allow Congress to create federal court jurisdiction for non-
federal claims where "necessary to protect important federal interests." Chemerinsky,
supra note 110, § 5.2.2, at 260. Goodman and Jinks dismiss protective jurisdiction as
an implausible rationale for international human rights litigation under the ATS. See
Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 478-79 n.89. We tend to agree. See Bradley &
Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 873 n.354.
210. See In re Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1474-75 (9th Cir. 1993); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 179 (D. Mass. 1995).
211. See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456-57 (1957).
212. Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844, 848 (11 th Cir. 1996).
213. Burley, The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 208, at 463; see also IT v. Vencap,
Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (The ATS "is a kind of legal Lohengrin;
although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act ... no one seems to know
whence it came.").
214. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9(b), 1 Stat. 73.
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art "referring to a court's power to try a case." 2 5 Casto also notes
that the First Congress used "entirely different language" when it cre-
ated statutory civil actions.2 16 This jurisdictional reading of the ATS is
confirmed by the current codification of the statute, which extends
"original jurisdiction" over certain cases brought by aliens.21 7 In sum,
the language of the ATS makes it highly unlikely that the drafters
envisioned it as creating federal substantive rights.
It is equally unlikely that the drafters of the ATS envisioned the
statute as authorizing Lincoln Mills-type federal common law making.
The First Congress lacked our positivist and realist conceptions of
common law.218 In ATS cases, as in other contexts, they would have
envisioned federal courts as applying a pre-existing, non-federal gen-
eral common law, which included the law of nations.2 11 In this milieu,
congressional authorization of Lincoln Mills-type federal common law
was unnecessary and, indeed, probably unthinkable. 2-'0
There is thus little reason to think that the ATS as originally written
incorporated CIL into federal law under either the federal cause of
action or the Lincoln Mills theory. An additional, independent diffi-
culty with viewing the ATS as a basis for modern human rights litiga-
tion concerns the dramatic differences between CIL when the statute
was written and as understood today. In 1789, the law of nations did
not purport to regulate the treatment of individuals by their own gov-
ernments. As Professor Slaughter correctly notes, "18th-century in-
ternational lawyers simply could not have imagined that the law of
nations would impose a positive obligation on a government with re-
spect to its own citizens." 1 The principal individual offenses against
the law of nations at the time the ATS was enacted were violations of
safe conduct, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy.'
Modern human rights litigation under the ATS, by contrast, primarily
concerns the way a foreign nation treats its citizens. In this light, the
pertinent question is the level of generality at which the ATS should
be interpreted: Does it authorize civil suits for law of nations viola-
tions in general, without regard to the changing content of the law of
215. Casto, supra note 156, at 479.
216. See id.
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
218. See Jay, The Origins, supra note 24, at 1309-10.
219. See Casto, supra note 156, at 480; William S. Dodge, The Historical Origins of
the Alien Tort Statute: A Response to the "Originalists," 19 Hastings Int'l Comp. L
Rev. 221, 232-34 (1996); Jay, The Status of the Law of Nations, supra note 11, at 822-
23.
220. See Dodge, supra note 219, at 234, 240.
221. Burley, The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 208, at 479 n.83.
222. See 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries 68 (1783).
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nations, or does it authorize civil suits for what was understood in
1789 to be the sorts of things regulated by the law of nations?2
23
Many federal courts have interpreted the ATS as authorizing suits
for violations of the new CIL that has developed since World War
II.224 This view of the ATS "creates a great potential for expanding
the reach of international law in U.S. courts. ' 225 Three factors, how-
ever, cut against this reading. First, Erie's repudiation of the general
common law background against which the ATS was enacted means
that the progressive reading of the ATS would not only extend juris-
diction to completely different types of international law claims, but it
would also read the ATS, in contrast to its original design, to apply
this new CIL of human rights as federal law. As a result, the progres-
sive reading of the ATS has potentially profound collateral implica-
tions for state law, federal question jurisdiction, and possibly the
legality of presidential actions that go far beyond anything that could
have been contemplated by the First Congress.
Second, there is general agreement that a significant purpose of the
ATS was to ensure that the United States complied with its obliga-
tions under international law by providing redress for certain viola-
tions of the law of nations. More specifically, a major impetus for the
ATS was unredressed attacks on ambassadors in the United States
during the Articles of Confederation period that implicated the U.S.
responsibility under international law.226 In this light, it appears that
the ATS was designed to give foreign governmental officials the pro-
tection of CIL as part of a larger effort by the United States to avoid
foreign relations controversies. This original purpose of the ATS con-
trasts sharply with its modern usage. The United States has no gen-
eral duty under international law to provide civil remedies in its courts
for human rights violations committed abroad by foreign government
officials against aliens.227 Moreover, the modern ATS uses CIL not as
223. One could accept the idea that the drafters meant to allow for changes in the
specific content of the law of nations, without accepting the idea that the ATS was
intended to cover the structurally very different new CIL. As Judge Bork observed:
It is one thing for a case like The Paquete Habana to find that a rule has
evolved so that the United States may not seize coastal fishing boats of a
nation with which we are at war. It is another thing entirely, a difference in
degree so enormous as to be a difference in kind, to find that a rule has
evolved against torture by government so that our courts must sit in judg-
ment of the conduct of foreign officials in their own countries with respect to
their own citizens.
Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork, J.,
concurring).
224. See, e.g., Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995); Filartiga v. Pena-
Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
225. Stephens & Ratner, International Human Rights Litigation, supra note 156, at
53.
226. See Casto, supra note 156, at 489-94; Dodge, supra note 219, at 226-30.
227. As Professor Slaughter has noted, "[s]trictly speaking, the duty of the United
States at international law extends no further than to refrain from violating the
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a shield to protect foreign governmental officials from torts commit-
ted in the United States, but rather as a sword to hold them civilly
liable for tortious acts that took place abroad. And, whatever else the
ATS may accomplish, it does not, in most instances anyway, promote
amicable inter-national relations.
The third difference concerns the extraterritorial use of the ATS.
Recall that under current practice, federal courts exercising jurisdic-
tion under the ATS create causes of action and remedies as a matter
of United States federal law to govern the activities of foreign govern-
ment officials on foreign soil. Such extraterritorial regulation would
have been unthinkable in the eighteenth century, a time when each
nation's regulatory power was limited to conduct either within the na-
tion's territory or by the nation's citizens.' The specific historical
context in which the ATS was enacted further suggests that its scope
was limited to acts that took place in or at least had some nexus to the
United States. As Judge Edwards explained in Tel-Oren, "the focus of
attention . . . was on actions occurring within the territory of the
United States, or perpetrated by a U.S. citizen, against an alien."'' 9
Modem ATS cases, by contrast, involve the application of U.S. causes
of action and remedies to extraterritorial acts that have no nexus
whatsoever to the United States. This broad extraterritorial scope
would have been inconceivable in 1789.-0° It also runs afoul of the
human rights of its own citizens." Burley, The Alien Tort Statute, supra note 208, at
492.
228. See Born, supra note 97, at 493-97, 549-50.
229. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards J., concurring).
230. Consistent with prevailing notions of territorialism, Oliver Ellsworth, the prin-
cipal drafter of the ATS, believed "that the United States lacked legislative jurisdic-
tion over transactions in foreign countries." Casto, supra note 156, at 485-86 n.97
(citing Letter from Chief Justice Ellsworth to Jonathan Trumbull (March 13, 1796)
(George Washington Papers, Library of Congress)). Some commentators and judges
claim that extraterritorial jurisdiction was recognized in 1789 for certain egregious
violations of international law, pursuant to the international law doctrine of hostis
humani generis. See, e.g., Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction
over International Hunan Rights Clains: The Alien Tort Clains Act after Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala, 22 Harv. J. Int'l L. 53, 60-62 (1981); Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 781 (Edwards,
J., concurring). No ATS case before 1980 considered the doctrine of hostis humanis
generis, but some nineteenth century courts did apply the doctrine to the acts of pi-
rates and, in some instances, slave traders. The scope of this doctrine was uncertain.
In United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818). the Court construed a fed-
eral piracy statute, which on its face extended to "any person" who committed piracy
on the high seas, not to apply to persons "who [were] not citizens of the United
States, nor sailing under their flag, nor offending particularly against them." Id. at
630-35. In United States v. Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144, 151-52 (1820), the Court
applied the same statute to piracy on the high seas committed by a U.S. citizen, while
suggesting that no jurisdictional nexus with the United States was necessary when the
pirate "acknowledg[ed] obedience to no government whatever." Even there, the
Court made clear that the statute did not apply to extraterritorial acts of persons
"under the acknowledged authority of a foreign [s]tate" committed against non-U.S.
citizens. Id. at 152; see also United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 192-96
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reinvigorated presumption in U.S. law against the extraterritorial ap-
plication of federal statutes.2 3' This presumption is designed at least
in part to ensure that the political branches rather than courts make
decisions about extraterritorial scope that might adversely implicate
U.S. foreign relations interests. 23 2 In recent years, the Court has in-
voked the presumption in numerous contexts to limit the extraterrito-
rial scope of statutes that contain far stronger suggestions of
extraterritorial intent than the ATS.r 3 It makes particular sense to
apply this presumption in the context of the ATS-a statute that is
(1820) (reaffirming that the same statute extends to piracy on the high seas by a crew
"whose conduct is such as to set at nought the idea of ... acting under allegiance to
any [foreign] power," while at the same time making clear that a murder on the high
seas by one non-citizen against another did not fall within the statute). Whatever
status the nineteenth century doctrine of hostis humani generis may have as a precur-
sor to modem international human rights law and universal jurisdiction, it cannot be
invoked as a basis to construe the original understanding of the ATS to extend to the
acts of a foreign sovereign and its agents committed on foreign soil in violation of
CIL. In addition to all of the independent evidence that the ATS had a different
scope, the notion of applying CIL to acts on foreign soil under color of law would
have been unthinkable. Consider what Justice Story, a judge otherwise supportive of
natural law claims and broad judicial power, said during this period in a related
context:
No one [nation] has a right to sit in judgment generally upon the actions of
another; at least to the extent of compelling its adherence to all the princi-
ples of justice and humanity in its domestic concerns. If a nation were to
violate as to its own subjects in its domestic regulation the clearest principles
of public law, I do not know, that that law has ever held them amenable to
the tribunals of other nations for such conduct. It would be inconsistent with
the equality and sovereignty of nations, which admit no common superior.
No nation has ever yet pretended to be the custos morum of the whole
world; and though abstractedly a particular regulation may violate the law of
nations, it may sometimes, in the case of nations, be a wrong without a
remedy.
United States v. La Juene Eugenie, 26 F. Cas. 832, 847 (D. Mass. 1822).
231. See Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173-74 (1993); Smith v.
United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244,
248 (1991); Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440-
41 (1989).
232. See Bradley, Territorial Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 112, at 140-53.
233. The extraterritoriality decision with the closest connection to the ATS is Ar-
gentine Republic v. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. 428 (1989). At issue there was the extra-
territorial scope of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA), which establishes
the grounds for jurisdiction in suits against foreign sovereigns. After holding that the
ATS could not be a basis for federal jurisdiction against foreign sovereigns because
the FSIA was the exclusive basis for such suits, id. at 433-38, the Court turned to the
scope of jurisdiction under the FSIA. Despite ambiguous statutory definitions sug-
gesting that FSIA jurisdiction might extend to a tort by a foreign sovereign on the
high seas, the Court applied the presumption to hold that the FSIA did not extend so
far. See id. at 440 (invoking "[tihe canon of construction which teaches that legislation
of Congress, unless contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the territo-
rial jurisdiction of the United States" (citation omitted)); id. ("When it desires to do
so, Congress knows how to place the high seas within the jurisdictional reach of the
statute."). This logic applies with even greater force to the ATS, which contains no
hint of extraterritorial scope, and which, unlike the FSIA, was drafted in a milieu in
which rigid territorialism was much more pervasive.
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silent about its extraterritorial scope, that lay largely fallow for nearly
200 years, and that, in contrast to anything imaginable when it was
enacted, is being invoked as a vehicle to regulate the way that foreign
governments treat foreign citizens on foreign soil.
In sum, dramatically changed circumstances between 1789 and
1980, when combined with (a) the ATS's textual suggestion that it
concerns only jurisdiction, (b) the implausibility of a cause of action or
Lincoln Mills interpretation of the ATS as an original matter, and (c)
the fact that the ATS lay practically dormant for nearly 200 years, lead
us to the conclusion that the ATS cannot support the modem practice.
C. The TVPA
Goodman and Jinks argue that, regardless of the best reading of the
ATS or of the original validity of Filartiga, the TVPA provides "spe-
cific evidence of congressional authorization of the Filartiga doc-
trine."'  Unfortunately for their argument, this specific evidence
consists almost exclusively of snippets of legislative history-language
in House and Senate Reports, and statements by the Act's spon-
sors.3 5 Moreover, this legislative history is more ambiguous about its
approval of Filartiga than Goodman and Jinks suggest. And, most im-
portantly, to the extent that the legislative history did approve of Fi-
lartiga, this approval is inconsistent wvith actual federal enactments-
including the TVPA itself-that indicate that Congress rejects Filar-
tiga's open-ended incorporation of CIL into federal law.
As Goodman and Jinks suggest, a proximate cause of the TVPA
was Judge Bork's opinion in Tel-Oren.36 In Tel-Oren, aliens accused
Libya, the PLO, and others of violating CIL prohibitions on torture
and summary execution in connection with an armed attack in Israel
in 1978. Bork's opinion rejected the Filartiga framework and argued
instead that jurisdiction under the ATS depended on the existence of
a cause of action under a federal statute, treaty, or CIL. He found no
such cause of action under any of these sources. Moreover, in order
"to avoid potential interference with the political branches' conduct of
foreign relations," he declined to infer one. --" Instead, he argued, the
court should wait for "affirmative action by Congress" before apply-
234. Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5. at 514.
235. They also cite to amicus curiae briefs written by law professors. See ul., supra
note 5, at 527.
236. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 798 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork,
J., concurring). There was no opinion of the court in Tel-Oren. All three judges on
the D.C. Circuit panel rejected the plaintiffs' claim under the ATS, albeit for different
reasons. See iL at 775 (Edwards, J., concurring): id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring). But
Judge Bork's opinion received the most notoriety. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato. What
Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawers? Judge Bork's Concept of the Law of Nations is Seriously
Mistaken, 79 Am. J. Int'l L. 92 (1985).
237. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 799.
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ing the 1789 ATS to modern human rights litigation that the drafters
of the Act could not have contemplated.
2 38
Congress provided this affirmative action in the TVPA.2 39 But far
from ratifying the wholesale incorporation of CIL assumed by Filar-
tiga, it created a federal cause of action only for torture and extra-
238. Id. at 801 (quoting Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971)); see also id. at 801-05.
239. The Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991 in its entirety provides:
Section 1. Short Title
This Act may be cited as the "Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991."
Section 2. Establishment of Civil Action
(a) Liability.-An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation-
(1) subjects an individual to torture shall, in a civil action, be liable for
damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action,
be liable for damages to the individual's legal representative, or to any
person who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
(b) Exhaustion of Remedies.-A court shall decline to hear a claim under
this section if the claimant has not exhausted adequate and available reme-
dies in the place in which the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred.
(c) Statute of Limitations.-No action shall be maintained under the provi-
sions of this section unless it is commenced within 10 years of the time after
the cause of action arose.
Section 3. Definitions
(a) Extrajudicial Killing.-For the purposes of this Act, the term "extrajudi-
cial killing" means a deliberated killing not authorized by a previous judg-
ment pronounced by a regularly constituted court affording all the judicial
guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized peoples. Such
term, however, does not include any such killing that, under international
law, is lawfully carried out under the authority of a foreign nation.
(b) Torture.-For the purposes of this Act-
(1) the term "torture" means any act, directed against an individual in
the offender's custody or physical control, by which severe pain or suf-
fering (other than pain or suffering arising only from or inherent in, or
incidental to, lawful sanctions), whether physical or mental, is intention-
ally inflicted on that individual for such purposes as obtaining from that
individual or a third person information or a confession, punishing that
individual for an act that individual or a third person has committed or
is suspected of having committed, intimidating or coercing that individ-
ual or a third person, or for any reason based on a discrimination of any
kind; and
(2) mental pain or suffering refers to prolonged mental harm caused by
or resulting from-
(A) the intentional infliction or threatened infliction of severe
physical pain or suffering;
(B) the administration or application, or threatened administration
or application, of mind altering substances or other procedures cal-
culated to disrupt profoundly the senses or the personality;
(C) the threat of imminent death; or
(D) the threat that another individual will imminently be subjected
to death, severe physical pain or suffering, or the administration or
application of mind altering substances or other procedures calcu-
lated to disrupt profoundly the senses or personality.
Torture Victim Protection Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-25, 106 Stat. 73 (1992).
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judicial killing.240 Consistent with this textual limitation, the House
and Senate Reports both emphasize the high degree of international
consensus concerning the illegality of torture and extrajudicial killing,
and they both state that "[t]he purpose of [the TVPA] is to provide a
Federal cause of action against any individual who, under actual or
apparent authority or under color of any foreign nation, subjects any
individual to torture or extrajudicial killing."24'
The TVPA's relatively narrow incorporation of international human
rights law into federal law differs from the Filartiga approach in sev-
eral respects. It limits the scope of the federal prohibition to acts
done under color of foreign law.242 It defines the new federal causes
of action with a careful precision that contrasts with the vague con-
tours of analogous CIL prohibitions.243 It includes an exhaustion re-
quirement that was designed to avoid unnecessary interference with
foreign nations and undue burden on U.S. courts .2" And it provides a
statute of limitations designed to avoid stale claims.24 5 In these re-
spects and others, the TVPA serves precisely the purpose sought by
Bork's opinion. It establishes a democratic foundation for the appli-
cation by U.S. courts of international law prohibitions on torture and
extrajudicial killing; it rectifies many of the substantive ambiguities of
the Filartiga approach to these international law prohibitions; and it
adds substantive and procedural limitations that balance the need to
promote two human rights norms with the countervailing concerns of
foreign relations and the burdened federal judiciary. 46
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, §§ 2(a), 3.
241. S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 3 (1991) (emphasis added), H. Rep. No. 102-367, at 2
(1991) (emphasis added).
242. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(a). Also unlike the Filartiga approach. the TVPA
permits U.S. citizens to sue for recovery. Id.
243. The TVPA's definitions of torture and extrajudicial killing are narrower than
those definitions under CIL and the Torture Convention. They track the definitions
adopted by the Senate's Understanding of the requirements of the Torture Conven-
tion, which was a condition to the Senate's consent to ratification of the treaty.
244. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(b); see also H. Rep. No. 102-367, at 87 (1991) (stat-
ing that the exhaustion requirement "ensures that U.S. courts will not intrude into
cases more appropriately handled by courts where the alleged torture or killing oc-
curred" and avoids "exposing U.S. courts to unnecessary burdens").
245. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note, § 2(c); see also H. Rep. No. 102-367, at 88 (1991) (the
statute of limitations requirement "ensures that the federal courts will not have to
hear stale claims").
246. Despite these limitations, President Bush expressed the following concerns
upon signing the legislation:
This legislation concerns acts of torture and extrajudicial killing committed
overseas by foreign individuals. With rare exceptions, the victims of these
acts will be foreign citizens. There is thus a danger that U.S. courts may
become embroiled in difficult and sensitive disputes in other countries, and
possibly ill-founded or politically motivated suits, which have nothing to do
with the United States and which offer little prospect of successful recovery.
Such potential abuse of this statute undoubtedly would give rise to serious
frictions in international relations and would also be a waste of our own
limited and already overburdened judicial resources.
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On its face, the TVPA appears to reject rather than embrace the
open-ended Filartiga approach to the judicial incorporation of CIL
into federal law. The TVPA's text does not remotely suggest an im-
plicit embrace of the Filartiga approach. If Congress had chosen to
federalize all CIL human rights prohibitions, it would have needed to
enact a significantly different, and broader, statute. Instead, in its first
consideration since 1789 of the meaning and scope of the ATS, Con-
gress in the TVPA federalized only prohibitions on torture and extra-
judicial killing. Moreover, the TVPA appears in fact to limit the
Filartiga approach with respect to these two central and important in-
ternational law prohibitions. Otherwise, one could bring torture and
extrajudicial killing claims under the Filartiga rationale without the
need to satisfy the TVPA's definitional, statute of limitations, and ex-
haustion requirements, thereby rendering the TVPA's careful substan-
tive and procedural compromises a nullity. In this light, it makes no
sense whatsoever to read the TVPA as implicitly federalizing, without
procedural or substantive limitation, other CIL human rights norms,
most of which are much less settled and central than torture and ex-
trajudicial killing.
This conclusion that the TVPA federalizes only two and not a host
of CIL norms is confirmed by other political branch enactments both
before and after the TVPA. These enactments indicate, contrary to
Filartiga's wholesale incorporation of CIL into federal law, that the
political branches are very stingy and selective in their incorporation
of international human rights norms into domestic federal law. Con-
sider, for example, the Torture Convention.247 The Senate consented
to ratification of the Convention in October, 1990, in the midst of de-
liberation about the TVPA but 18 months before its enactment. At
the recommendation of President Bush, the Senate attached a number
of conditions to its consent that reveal an unambiguous desire to en-
sure that the Convention has no effect on contrary domestic law ab-
sent subsequent federal legislation.248 When Congress enacted this
subsequent legislation in the TVPA, it adopted the Senate's definition
of torture and extrajudicial killing, which were narrower than CIL.
Statement by President George Bush Upon Signing H.R. 2092, 28 Weekly Compila-
tion of Presidential Documents 465, March 16, 1992, reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N.
91.
247. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treat-
ment or Punishment, S. Treaty Doc. 100-20 (1988), 23 I.L.M. 1027 (1984), as modified,
24 I.L.M. 535 (1985).
248. Most significantly, the Senate insisted that the substantive provisions of the
Torture Convention, Articles 1-16, were "not self-executing." See Committee on For-
eign Relations, Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, S. Exec. Rep. No. 101-30, at 31. This means that the Tor-
ture Convention does not apply as domestic federal law in the absence of implement-
ing legislation by Congress. The Senate also imposed various reservations and
understandings that together ensure that the Convention does not trump otherwise
inconsistent federal and state law. See id. at 29-30.
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The Torture Convention and the TVPA reflect a broader and unam-
biguous pattern of political branch resistance to open-ended incorpo-
ration of international human rights norms that might interfere with
domestic state and federal law. The numerous reservations, under-
standings, and declarations attached to the Torture Convention were
replicated in the Senate's consent to the Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Discrimination, and the Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights.2 49 The same pattern can be seen in statutes that se-
lectively incorporate international human rights norms into federal
law. The 1987 Genocide Convention Implementation Act, for exam-
ple, made genocide a federal crime. 5 0 It carefully limited this crime,
however, to acts committed within the United States or by U.S. na-
tionals, and it specified that the federal crime did not preclude "appli-
cation of State or local laws" to the same conduct and did not
"creat[e] any substantive or procedural right enforceable by law by
any party in any proceeding."251 None of these narrow, selective, and
carefully-defined incorporations of human rights law into federal law
make any sense if Congress in the TVPA had actually approved of
Filartiga's wholesale incorporation of the CIL of human rights into
federal law.
This is the background against which the legislative history of the
TVPA must be read. This legislative history does approve of Filartiga
in places. But even this approval is ambiguous. It does not make
clear, for example, whether it approves of Filartiga's wholesale incor-
poration of CIL into federal law, which would bind the states and per-
haps the President, or rather whether it merely approves of the
judicial incorporation of the CIL of human rights as applied to foreign
governmental acts. Nor does it say anything about whether the sub-
stantive and procedural limitations of the TVPA apply to ATS cases.
Whatever its meaning, there is a good reason why this approval of
Filartiga is in the legislative history rather than the text of the TVPA.
The TVPA was approved by Congress only after years of debate, com-
promise, and precise drafting that limited the original bill's scope in
several respects. 2 It is extremely unlikely that the members of Con-
gress who demanded these changes and ultimately voted for the
TVPA would have assented to the much broader, open-ended, and
undefined Filartiga approach, which includes many more CIL prohibi-
249. See Henkin, U.S. Ratification, supra note 51, at 342-44.
250. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1091-92 (Supp. 1997).
251. Id, §§ 1091(d), 1092.
252. The TVPA was first introduced in 1986 and finally enacted in 1991. During
this period, the sponsors of the bill added (among other things) an exhaustion re-
quirement, a statute of limitations, and a narrower definition of torture in order to
accommodate the concerns of numerous members of Congress. See 138 Cong. Rec.
S2667 (daily ed. March 3, 1992) (statement of Senator Grassley); 137 Cong. Rec.
S1378 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1991) (statement of Senator Specter); 137 Cong. Rec.
H11244-04 (daily ed. Nov. 25, 1991) (statement of Congressman Mazzoli).
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tions than the TVPA, contains no procedural limitations, and might
trump state law. This fact, combined with the ambiguities in the legis-
lative history and the countervailing indications of other congressional
enactments, suggests that the TVPA should not be read as implicitly
ratifying Filartiga.
At the end of the day, the weight to be given to the TVPA's legisla-
tive history will depend on one's view regarding the appropriate
sources of statutory interpretation. We have tried to present reasons
why even someone who thinks that legislative history is a significant
source of statutory meaning might not view this aspect of the TVPA's
legislative history as reflecting federal law. If Congress really does
support the Filartiga logic as strongly as Goodman and Jinks believe,
there is nothing to fear from a requirement that Congress express this
approval in a statute rather than in ambiguous legislative history. It is
much more likely, however, that Congress will continue to incorporate
CIL on a very selective basis with numerous procedural limitations
and without preempting inconsistent state law.
CONCLUSION
Some might think that our arguments reflect hostility towards
human rights or international law. This is not our view. The growing
international recognition that a government cannot, under the guise of
sovereignty, violate the basic individual rights of its citizens is one of
the most positive moral and legal developments in the post-World
War II period. The human rights revolution does not exist, however,
in a legal vacuum on the international or the domestic plane. Legal
structures can reflect the human rights revolution in a number of
ways, and some are more effective and legitimate than others. Do-
mestic constitutionalism has been the primary vehicle for recognition
and enforcement of human rights in this country. European nations
and other countries have begun to achieve similar ends through the
interaction of domestic constitutionalism and international organiza-
tions constituted and governed by treaty.
CIL presents a third legal mechanism for the recognition of interna-
tional human rights. But the new CIL of human rights raises serious
questions not raised by other methods for enforcing international
human rights. On the international plane, there is no clear conception
regarding how this new CIL is made or identified, and there is even
more uncertainty regarding how it fits into the traditional structures of
international law. This article has focused on the different question of
how the new CIL fits into the domestic constitutional structure of the
United States. CIL's domestic legal status has significance in the en-
forcement of human rights in this country, because the federal polit-
ical branches have largely conditioned ratification of international
human rights treaties on their non-enforceability as domestic law.
Our prior work argued that the modern position view that the new
[Vol. 66
1997] HUMAN RIGHTS STANDARDS & U.S. LAW 369
CIL is automatically incorporated into federal common law is incon-
sistent with fundamental constitutional values. In this Article, we
have further argued that, with minor exceptions, current federal stat-
utes do not support incorporation of substantive rules of the new CIL
of human fights.
In the United States, international law has long suffered from
doubts of legitimacy-in the academy, in policy circles, and in the
popular mind. One reason for these doubts is that international law is
viewed as something alien to our political and legal traditions. An-
other reason is that international lawyers often confound law and as-
piration. We believe that the current structure of international human
fights litigation in U.S. courts only increases these doubts. And this,
in turn, raises the question of whether the current system helps or
hinders the ultimate enforceability of international human rights law.
Our hope is that by highlighting the difficulties of the modern posi-
tion, we might actually contribute to placing international law gener-
ally and international human rights law specifically on a more secure
constitutional foundation.
Notes & Observations
